



2003 Southern California Fires AFTER ACTION REPORT



June 17, 2004

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2003

Southern California

Wildfires

After Action Report

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**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES**

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GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES AFTER ACTION REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This document provides information on the 2003 Southern California fires. In California, as part of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), statute requires the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) to produce an After Action Report (AAR) within 120 days after each declared disaster. "This report shall review public safety response and disaster recovery activities." The supporting SEMS regulations require jurisdictions "declaring a local emergency for which the governor proclaims a state of emergency, and any state agency responding to that emergency shall complete and transmit an after action report to OES within ninety (90) days of the close of the incident period." Although the 2003 Southern California wildfires incident period officially closed on March 31, 2004, state agencies, local government and other stakeholders were requested to provide their AARs to OES by February 20, 2004. The purpose of this accelerated reporting requirement was two-fold: 1) to capture response efforts, lessons learned, and any recommendations before critical data was lost due to the passage of time, and 2) to ensure that information from the AAR process was accessible to the Blue Ribbon Fire Commission.

BACKGROUND

Beginning on October 21, 2003, southern California experienced the worst wildfire sieges in California's history. When the worst of the fires ended on November 5, 2003, there were 24 deaths (including one firefighter), 246 injuries, 3,631 structures destroyed and 739,597 acres blackened by 14 different fires in five counties. The response cost/damage estimate is over 3 billion dollars and required 15,631 personnel, including firefighters, law enforcement, administrative support, and management staff, to assist with fire suppression efforts.

The catastrophic nature of these fires prompted Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, San Bernardino, Riverside and Ventura counties to proclaim local emergencies. Governor Davis proclaimed a State of Emergency on October 26, 2003 for the counties of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San Diego and Ventura and requested a Presidential Declaration. President Bush issued a Presidential Declaration of Major Disaster for four of the five affected counties on October 27, 2003. Riverside County was added to the list of federally declared disasters on October 30, 2003.

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Additional losses were caused by a normal December storm in the burned areas that resulted in floods and mudflows. Sixteen people were killed in a San Bernardino County canyon, neighborhoods in San Bernardino and San Diego counties were inundated with mud, and the flood control debris basins in San Bernardino County were filled to near capacity by the two-day event.

The California Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid System brought together more resources than had ever been used in its 54-year history. This system effectively coordinated the response of approximately 5,480 personnel that staffed 1,160 local government fire engines and 102 OES fire engines. California's neighboring states, Nevada, Arizona, and Oregon, also provided vital support to the siege by sending in 120 additional fire engines and the accompanying staff. Combined local, state, and federal resources totaled 15,631 personnel from the fire services and 1,898 fire engines. It exceeded the previous wildfire record set by the Wildland Fires of 1993.

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

OES prepared this comprehensive AAR on the 2003 Southern California Fire Siege. State agencies and operational areas (OAs) submitted their AARs using the Response Information Management System (RIMS) AAR form (original or modified versions). In addition, OES conducted fact-finding meetings with the impacted OAs during January 2004. OAs were given the option of using the fact-finding meeting (and supporting documentation) as their official AAR instead of completing the RIMS form.

Recommendations

The AAR process allowed OES to identify numerous recommendations for improving future responses to major incidents. Specific, itemized recommendations, which will subsequently become the basis for corrective actions, are contained in detail in the comprehensive statewide AAR. Below are the final findings and recommendations that fall into eight broad categories:

1. **Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)**: Most local governments and state agencies indicated that SEMS functioned well and helped them mount an effective response. Several agencies made specific recommendations to improve SEMS including: (1) capitalize upon existing SEMS strengths; (2) implement proposed modifications or refinements to SEMS based protocols and procedures; (3) modify RIMS to make it more user friendly; (4) conduct SEMS training on a continuous basis to ensure all potential responders have the appropriate training; and, (5) encourage SEMS training for federal agencies to foster federal-state integration at the Disaster Field Office (DFO).
2. **Mutual Aid (MA)**: Most local government representatives mentioned several areas for improving MA response and capabilities. These areas include (1) providing more mutual aid training to assist with coordination issues; (2) establishing a statewide standard badging identification system to allow appropriate personnel access to restricted areas;

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- (3) encouraging state agencies to develop protocols regarding use of their local agency office personnel and equipment, and (4) addressing the issue of possible reimbursement.
3. Communications: Local government and state agencies need to have more interoperable communications in order to have a rapid and effective response. A number of local governments recommended that OES establish additional caches of communications equipment for easy access during disaster response. Local government and state agencies need to evaluate their communication systems to ensure there is interoperability and redundancy.
 4. Interstate Coordination: Some states were unfamiliar with the provisions of the signed Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact as it relates to response and reimbursement. A fact sheet needs to be developed that describes how to activate and use the Compact. Several agencies indicated there is a need to streamline the method for obtaining out-of-state resources to reduce the resource acquisition time frame.
 5. Accessing Federal Military Assets: Local government and state fire agencies indicated there is a need to streamline the method of obtaining federal military assets to reduce the resource acquisition time frame.
 6. Federal-State Coordination: Local government and state agencies indicated a need for a smoother transition from response to recovery. The consensus among respondents was that plans and procedures should be developed for the DFO to effectively integrate federal and state agency staff at the DFO and to minimize unnecessary organizational issues. (In addition, the flood threat and subsequent floods and mudflow demonstrated the need for agencies to be flexible and able to alternate between response, recovery, and back to the response mode.)
 7. State Agency Plans and Procedures: Several state agencies that had not been involved in previous disaster response activities identified a need to rework their plans and procedures to incorporate SEMS and mutual aid. Existing emergency plans in some agencies need to be revised to include the following issues: debris management, animal care during disasters, volunteer management, donations management, and medical/health/mental health integration.
 8. Financial Issues: Reimbursement issues need to be resolved for mutual aid deployments, volunteer organizations and other entities. All agencies identified a need for funding for training - regardless of the type of training. In addition, funding is needed for long-term environmental impacts due to the burned out and denuded landscapes

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ORGANIZATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS REPORT:

State Agencies and Departments

California Conservation Corps
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
California Highway Patrol
California Department of Transportation
California Environmental Protection Agency
California National Guard (State Military Department)
Department of Aging
Department of Community Services and Development
Department of Corrections
Department of Fish and Game
Department of Food and Agriculture
Department of Health Services
Department of Industrial Relations
Department of Insurance
Department of Justice
Department of Mental Health
Department of Motor Vehicles
Department of Parks and Recreation
Department of Social Services
Department of Water Resources
Emergency Medical Services Authority
Governor's Office of Emergency Services
Governor's Office on Service and Volunteerism

Local Government

Los Angeles County (Operational Area)
Riverside County (Operational Area)
San Bernardino County (Operational Area)
San Diego County (Operational Area)
Ventura County (Operational Area)

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Introduction and Background

Type of Event Extensive wildfires with resulting mudflows in burned out areas.

Locations Southern California: Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Ventura counties and Native American tribal communities located in these counties.

Period October 21, 2003 to March 31, 2004

Brief Description of Event This report describes the statewide response and recovery activities resulting from a series of wildfires in Southern California. These wildfires were so extensive and of such a magnitude that this event is being referred to as the “2003 Southern California Wildfire Siege”. The fire siege began on October 21, 2003, and continued to ravage southern California until November 5, 2003.

Weather was the crucial factor in this siege. For much of the period, high temperatures and raging “Santa Ana” winds drove the fires with unprecedented fury. Firefighters were finally able to bring the conflagrations under control when the weather changed and brought more favorable conditions. Also, during much of this period, northern California was experiencing high temperatures and “red flag warnings”. The incipient fire danger in the northern part of the state impacted the mobilization of firefighting resources for the south. (Some northern California firefighting assets had to be held in reserve.) Finally, weather again brought more misery to burned-out portions of southern California in December 2003, with flooding, mudflows, and slides.

This siege included 14 major fires over a contiguous five county area. Over 14,000 firefighters from local, state, and federal agencies were mobilized for the firefighting efforts. Concurrently, there were extensive commitments from law enforcement, emergency management, medical/public health, care and shelter resources and other entities. California’s mutual aid systems were used and tested. Resources were drawn from a wide array of local, state, and federal sources, including out-of-state organizations. In some instances, volunteers assisted local law enforcement during evacuations, aided care and shelter operations, and assisted with animal rescue.

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After the fires were suppressed, the flooding, mudflows and slides that came with the winter rain extended the disaster event. In December a relatively mild storm event resulted in floods and mudslides that killed 16 people in San Bernardino County and buried neighborhoods in San Bernardino and San Diego Counties. The first storm filled all the debris basins in San Bernardino County. Fearing the results of a normal winter rainfall, the Department of Water Resources used its authority under PL 84-99 to request assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers to clear the basins. The basins were cleared and no further flooding occurred. The damage caused by the December storm was included in the disaster recovery efforts for the fire.

The costs of the fires were staggering – 3,631 homes, 36 commercial buildings and 1,169 other buildings were destroyed, and 739,597 acres blackened. Twenty-four (24) people died (including one firefighter) and 246 people were injured. Watersheds and natural habitats were destroyed. Infrastructure- such as communications and power lines- was severely compromised and required extensive restoration efforts. There were health impacts from the heavy smoke for those with medical conditions. Thousands of people had to evacuate their homes, schools, and businesses. Many returned only to find blackened ruins.

Finally, there will be lingering significant long-term recovery and financial impacts for southern California communities, including Native American tribal communities. These communities will need to focus on rebuilding and future mitigation efforts. Land-use and planning will be a concern throughout much of the area

Proclamations and Declarations

The Governor proclaimed a state of emergency for the counties of San Bernardino, Ventura (10/25/03), Los Angeles, San Diego (10/26/03) and Riverside (10/ 27/03). Following the Governor's proclamation and request for federal assistance, President Bush declared these counties (except Riverside) major disaster areas, making them eligible for Individual Assistance (IA) programs, such as US Small Business Administration (SBA) loans, federal grants, state grants; Public Assistance (PA) programs for debris removal and emergency protective measures, and implemented the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. On October 30, 2003, the Presidential Declaration was amended to include Riverside County. Mudflows and additional damage to the operational areas from several severe storms caused the incident period to be extended to March 31, 2004.

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SEMS Use and Function Evaluation:

Overview California uses the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) during disasters and emergencies. The computerized component of the system, the Response Information System (RIMS), is used to manage data, reports, and resources. The following section discusses the application of SEMS and RIMS to the Southern California fires.

SEMS/RIMS Positive Comments/Outcomes Most agencies and organizations indicated that SEMS generally functioned well and helped them mount an effective response. Several organizations proposed modifications or refinements. The following SEMS/RIMS areas were identified as requiring improvement:

1. Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS): Several agencies made specific recommendations to improve SEMS including: (1) capitalize upon existing SEMS strengths; (2) implement proposed modifications or refinements to SEMS based protocols and procedures; (3) modify the Response Information Management System (RIMS) to make it more user friendly; (4) conduct SEMS training on a continuous basis to ensure all potential responders have the appropriate training; and, (5) encourage SEMS training for federal agencies to foster federal-state integration at the Disaster Field Office (DFO).
2. Mutual Aid (MA): Most local government representatives mentioned several areas for improving MA response and capabilities. These areas include (1) providing more mutual aid training to assist with coordination issues; (2) establishing a statewide standard badging identification system to allow appropriate personnel access to restricted areas; (3) encouraging state agencies to develop protocols regarding use of their local agency office personnel and equipment, and (4) addressing the issue of possible reimbursement.

It has also been suggested that SEMS be used for managing events that have not evolved into disasters, but which may pose a potential threat. (For example, the stands of trees devastated by Bark Beetle and drought.)

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Summary of Other Recommended Improvements

Overview

In addition to recommendations regarding SEMS and RIMS, there were also other areas that elicited comments from the AAR respondents in the areas of communications, interstate coordination, accessing federal military assets, federal–state coordination, state agency plans and procedures, and financial issues. These areas of concern are addressed below:

Areas of Concern

1. Communications: Local government and state agencies need to have more interoperable communications in order to have a rapid and effective response. A number of local governments recommended that OES establish additional caches of communications equipment for easy access during disaster response. Local government and state agencies need to evaluate their communication systems to ensure there is interoperability and redundancy.
2. Interstate Coordination: Some states were unfamiliar with the provisions of the signed Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact as it relates to response and reimbursement. A fact sheet needs to be developed that describes how to activate and use the Compact. Several agencies indicated there is a need to streamline the method for obtaining out-of-state resources to reduce the resource acquisition time frame.
3. Accessing Federal Military Assets: Local government and state fire agencies indicated there is a need to streamline the method for obtaining federal military assets to reduce the resource acquisition time frame.
4. Federal-State Coordination: Local government and state agencies indicated a need for a smoother transition from response to recovery. The consensus among respondents was that plans and procedures should be developed for the DFO to effectively integrate federal and state agency staff at the DFO and to minimize unnecessary organizational issues. (In addition, the flood threat and subsequent floods and mudflow demonstrated the need for agencies to be flexible and able to alternate between response, and recovery, and back to the response mode.)

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5. State Agency Plans and Procedures: Several state agencies that had not been involved in previous disaster response activities identified a need to rework their plans and procedures to incorporate SEMS and mutual aid. Existing emergency plans in some agencies need to be revised to include the following issues: debris management, animal care during disasters, volunteer management, donations management, and medical/health/mental health integration.
6. Financial Issues: Reimbursement issues need to be resolved for mutual aid deployments, volunteer organizations and other entities. All agencies identified a need for funding for training - regardless of the type of training. In addition, funding is needed for long-term environmental impacts due to the burned out and denuded landscapes.

Specific Recommendations

Recommendations Section

Specific recommendations regarding SEMS, RIMS, and response or recovery activities are contained in the Recommendations section (Attachment B) of this report.

- “Recommendations” are arranged by category in a series of matrices. Many organizations had very similar recommendations. Therefore, some of the recommendations represent a consolidation of similar comments.
- The recommendations contained in the matrices reflect cross cutting, common, or system-wide fixes that should be addressed by follow-up planning activities.
- Potential “key players” are identified. The actual implementation (of recommendations) may involve more organizations. “Lead” organizations for each recommendation will need to be determined during subsequent follow-up planning activities.

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Federal Agencies Several federal agencies were involved in both the response and recovery efforts associated with the fire siege and its aftermath. This report is not intended to evaluate or record their activities. Those tasks are better left to the federal system. Federal agencies are mentioned in this report in connection with joint jurisdictional activities (federal /state/local) in both the response and recovery sections.

Additional information can be found in the Blue Ribbon Fire Commission's *Report to the Governor* released in May 2004. Californians are truly grateful that federal agencies- and funding- helped California respond to and recover from the fire siege and its consequences.

Response Activities

Operational Areas The OA response was characterized by combined firefighting efforts involving local, state, federal, and, some cases, tribal firefighting personnel and equipment. Law enforcement, mental health, and emergency management mutual aid was employed to deal with a variety of response situations in support of firefighting operations. In some instances, existing planning activities, such as the Mountain Area Safety Taskforce (MAST) in San Bernardino, paid dividends when large populations were required to rapidly evacuate areas. Also, San Bernardino OA created a Flood Safety Task Force (FAST) to plan for the potential response to flood threats after the fires. Information on the OAs response is contained in the Response Detail section (Attachment D) of this report.

State Agencies and Departments Over 20 state agencies and departments were involved in a wide array of response activities, including fire fighting, aviation support, logistical operations, traffic control, environmental impact assessments, and so on. In many instances, the fires directly impacted state agencies and personnel. State agencies supported California's mutual aid systems, such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, and medical mutual aid.

State agencies and departments response activities are reflected in:

- The Response Summary Chart (Attachment C), which summarizes response activities for state agencies and departments.

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The Response Detail (Attachment D), which provides more detail on response activities for each participating agency/department.

Recovery Activities to Date

General background Beginning October 25, through October 30, 2003, President Bush declared five southern California counties to be major disaster areas, including the counties of San Bernardino, Ventura, Los Angeles, San Diego and Riverside respectively. The declaration made the counties eligible for state and federal Individual Assistance (IA) programs for individuals, homeowners, businesses, and agricultural communities, and Public Assistance (PA) programs for debris removal and emergency protective measures. The declaration also activated the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.

Specific elements of the recovery process are described below.

Disaster Field Office (DFO) To administer the state and federal disaster assistance programs, FEMA and State OES established a Disaster Field Office (DFO) in Pasadena and two Public Assistance program satellite offices in San Bernardino and San Diego. In addition, OES staff coordinated with local agencies to establish seven Local Assistance Centers (LACs), providing disaster assistance and information to individuals at centralized/one-stop locations in each county. The DFO also opened and operated several FEMA-sponsored and state-staffed Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs). The two types of centers--LACs and DRCs--were provided to maximize assistance and referral information to the communities. In all, a total of 129 staff from OES and numerous state agencies worked at the DFO, the satellite offices, the LACs or the DRC.

Preliminary Damage Assessment Through the first week in November 2003, OES staff conducted the preliminary damage assessments (PDAs). Total damage to the five-county area was estimated at \$184.7 million with \$141 million in debris removal and emergency costs, and \$43 million in permanent restoration costs. FEMA concurred with the estimate.

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Public Assistance e Program

Approximately 40 OES staff coordinated with FEMA to implement the Public Assistance (PA) Program to provide financial assistance to government agencies. Major activities performed by OES staff included:

- Providing hundreds of hours of technical assistance on the program to subgrantees;
- Conducting six applicant briefings to inform potential government applicants of the state and federal assistance available;
- Conducting 275 Kick-off Meetings for eligible applicants to explain the specific program requirements;
- Formulating 1100 Project Worksheets (PWs) describing the project scope of work to be performed;
- Developing and distributing thousands of educational fact sheets and publications
- Informing the public affected by the disaster of the federal and state assistance available through news releases and media briefings.

Individual Assistance Program

OES staff coordinated with numerous federal, state, local, and voluntary agencies in implementing various assistance programs for individuals, families, business owners, farmers, and ranchers. Activities included coordinating with federal and state agencies to implement and monitor the following programs:

- The Assistance to Individuals and Households Program (IHP) to help individuals and households with necessary expenses and serious needs.
- The State Supplemental Grant Program (SSGP) to provide additional funds to individuals and households for essential needs when the maximum IHP program limit has been reached.
- The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans for individuals and businesses.
- The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) emergency loans for farm, ranch, and aquaculture operations as a result of physical and crop production losses.
- Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for disaster-related unemployment, including the self-employed, as a direct result of a major disaster.
- Crisis Counseling, education, and intervention services to help people cope with the adverse psychological effects of a disaster.

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- OES staff worked with FEMA to ensure that disaster information was disseminated through the Disaster Help Line and to assure these programs were available through teleregistration and assistance centers.
- Regarding the IHP, OES staff coordinated with FEMA to ensure that eligible individuals and households received the maximum federal funding assistance available for essential needs and household expenses pertaining to temporary housing, repair, personal property, medical/dental/funeral, moving/storage, transportation, and other needs. OES staff coordinated with the State Department of Social Services to ensure that assistance under the SSGP became available for individuals and households having additional essential needs beyond the maximum IHP program limits.

Assistance Centers

OES IA staff coordinated with local, state, and federal entities in opening, staffing, operating, and demobilizing a variety of assistance centers. Staff also worked with the federal and state information officers and the media to ensure that the public was aware of the centers and available services offered. A total of 14 centers were open at various times during the recovery period following the declaration to provide one-on-one services for information and referrals.

Hazard Mitigation Program

OES Hazard Mitigation staff coordinated with FEMA staff in providing information to the public and news media related to the Hazard Mitigation and the National Flood Insurance Program (NIFP). Specifically, OES staff helped:

- Evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures;
- Identify flood and mudflow risks resulting from the fire, as well as other significant risks in the area, in coordination with local, state and federal agencies;
- Develop and distribute educational materials.

This effort resulted in identifying the following priorities for the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program:

- Flood and mudflow mitigation projects in the impacted area;
- Fire mitigation projects;
- Elevation or acquisition of repetitively damaged structures or structures in high hazard areas:

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- Fire, flood, and earthquake protection of “emergency facilities”
- Single and multi-jurisdictional local hazard mitigation planning;
- Mitigation supporting measures;
- Codes and standards;
- Educational Hazard Mitigation Programs;
- Studies supporting local hazard mitigation plans; and
- Warning systems.

Finally, OES Hazard Mitigation staff played a lead role- along with FEMA- in the creation and operation of the Multi-Agency Support Group (MASG). The MASG was created to assist local government with resolving funding and policy issues, which addressed the risk from potential flood and mudflows resulting from the southern California wildfires. Representatives on the MASG included the five (5) County/Operational Areas, the National Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, United States Geological Society (USGS), and CDF. Issues addressed included:

- Potential funding sources for clearing out debris basins;
- Emergency protective measures for preventing or mitigating against possible mudflows endangering lives and property;
- Coordinating intelligence information through Geographic Information System (GIS) and Operational Areas on the flood and mudflow threat throughout the five (5) county areas.
- Total costs for flood and mudflow protective measures were estimated at \$15 million, most of which was for the cleaning of debris basins (\$12-13 million) and the remainder for other emergency measures.

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**ATTACHMENT A
ACRONYMS**

ARB	Air Reserve Base
AAR	After Action Report
BDO	Boards, Departments, and Offices
BRC	Blue Ribbon Fire Commission
BWO	Boil Water Order
CALMAC	California Multi-Agency Coordination Group
CARES	California Animal Response Emergency Systems
CCP	Crisis Counseling Program
CDF	California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CERT	Citizens Emergency Response Training
CESRS	California Emergency Services Radio System
CFAA	California Fire Assurances Agreement
CICCS	California Incident Command Certification System
CLERS	California Law Enforcement Radio System
CLETS	California Law Enforcement Teletype System
CNG	California National Guard
CSTI	California Specialized Training Institute
CUEA	California Utilities Emergency Association
CVMA	California Veterinary Medical Association
CWCG	California Wildfire Coordinating Group
DAD	Disaster Assistance Division
DFO	Disaster Field Office
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMU	Donations Management Unit
DOC	Departmental Operations Center
DOD	Department of Defense
DRC	Disaster Recovery Center
DSCO	Deputy State Coordinating Officer
DUA	Disaster Unemployment Assistance
DWR	Department of Water Resources
EDIS	Emergency Digital Information System
EDO	Executive Duty Officer
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMI	Emergency Management Institute
EMMA	Emergency Manager's Mutual Aid
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOPT	Emergency Operations Planning and Training
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHWA	Federal Highway Administration
FIRESCOPE	Fire Fighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies
FMAG	Fire Management Assistance Grant

GIS	Geographic Information System
IA	Individual Assistance
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IDE	Initial Damage Estimate
IHP	Individuals and Households Program
IT	Information Technology
LAC	Local Assistance Center
MA	Mutual Aid
MACS	Multi-Agency Coordination System
MAFFS	Mobile Airborne Fire Fighting System
MARAC	Mutual Aid Regional Advisory Committee
MASG	Multi-Agency Support Group
MAST	Mountain Area Safety Task Force
MIRPS	Multi-Agency Incident Resource Processing System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NNG	Nevada National Guard
NRCS	Natural Resource Conservation Service
NWCG	National Wildfire Coordinating Group
OA	Operational Area
OASIS	Operational Area Satellite Information System
OCC	Operation Coordination Center
OES	Office of Emergency Services
ONG	Oregon National Guard
PA	Public Assistance
PDA	Preliminary Damage Assessment
PIO	Public Information Officer
PTR	Project Time R
REOC	Regional Emergency Operations Center
RIMS	Response Information Management System
ROSS	Resource Ordering and Status System
SAT	Staff Activation Team
SBA	US Small Business Administration
SCO	State Coordinating Officer
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
SOC	State Operations Center
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPC	Single Point of Contact
SSGP	State Supplemental Grant Program
SWP	State Water Project
TAG	The Adjutant General
TEC	Travel Expense Claim

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**ATTACHMENT A
ACRONYMS**

USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USGS	United States Geographical Society
VEST	Volunteer Emergency Services Team
VOAD	Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster
WFSA	Wild land Fire Situation Analysis

AREA: SEMS

Recommended by:	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Voluntary organizations need to become more familiar with SEMS	Ensure that volunteer organizations receive training on SEMS appropriate to level of assignment	OES, GOSERV, volunteer organizations	SEMS Training
State agency	Donations management function within SEMS at local level was weak or non-existent.	Work with local government on donations management issues. (Note: OES and GOSERV are currently working on a donations management plan)	OES, GOSERV, volunteer organizations	SEMS functions
State agency	Volunteer agencies throughout the state are conducting disaster response and recovery activities and their roles during a disaster are not adequately addressed at any level.	Develop plans/protocols to address volunteer agencies and resources both at the state and local levels. Include federally funded programs, such as AmeriCorps, Volunteer Centers, and Citizen Corps, etc. (Note: OES and GOSERV are currently working on a document to address volunteer resource management. GOSERV is working on a template for local government through the State Citizen Corps Council stakeholder organization.)	OES, GOSERV, volunteer organizations	SEMS functions and training

AREA: SEMS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	The capabilities of trained and equipped volunteer resources were not utilized to their capacity nor was their availability clearly known.	Through local and state plan development and other forums, provide training to local first responders on the capacity and proper involvement of volunteer resource teams, such as Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT); Medical Reserve Corps; Volunteers in Police Service, and others.	GOSERV, OES, others	SEMS functions and training
State agency	Advance planning in connection with post fire flooding, debris flow, and water quality issues did not receive the emphasis it deserved and on a timely basis. One state agency repeatedly tried to raise these issues. It took several tries by this agency before its concerns were addressed.	Strengthen the advance planning process in the Planning and Intelligence function at all levels. Stress the importance and practical implications of items identified during the advance planning process. Identify methods for following up on advance planning issues. Conduct training on advance planning. <i>For this specific event, there needs to be follow-up on post fire flooding. Specific plans will need to be developed to address this issue.</i>	OES, other state agencies (DWR, CDF, DFG), local government, and federal agencies	SEMS functions and training

AREA: SEMS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	The use of GIS mapping after the initial disaster and during recovery needs to be coordinated.	Work with key stakeholders to establish a system to collect and coordinate existing local, state and federal GIS resources. Need to establish a methodology to over-lay hazard information on current topographic, demographic, facilities and other information. Need to develop protocols and linkages among different levels of government. Note: The issue of GIS as part of Plans/Intell has also been discussed.	OES, other state agencies such as CDF, local government and federal agencies	SEMS functions
State agency	Federal agencies didn't seem that familiar with SEMS.	Federal agencies need SEMS training for future incidents	OES	SEMS training
State agencies	State agencies that respond to the SOC/REOC need more frequent SEMS training at all levels	Assist state agencies with obtaining SEMS training (through the California Specialized Training Institute- CSTI). Find funding to ensure training is accomplished frequently enough to address employee turnover.	OES and other agencies	SEMS training/funding

AREA: SEMS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Staff had problems with the RIMS forms “timing out” and losing large amounts of data. Also, develop user-friendly instructions for RIMS for use during disasters.	Work with OES RIMS IT staff to resolve “timing out” issue. OES RIMS IT staff should develop instructions for forms. Consider “just-in-time” RIMS training related to instructions.	OES and key stakeholders	SEMS and RIMS forms
State agency	RIMS Reliability: Problems with completing “Duty Logs” and “Care and Shelter Status Reports” using RIMS required staff to report using FAX and telephones.	DSS recommends conversion to Windows based software. OES should work with DSS and other state agencies that experienced problems with reporting via RIMS to determine whether it is a training issue or RIMS related problem that may need to be resolved by IT.	OES, DSS, other state and local agencies	RIMS Reporting
State agency	Medical/health staff need guidelines and procedures.	Create web-based access to SEMS information and position checklists, shift change protocols for staff working in EOCs, REOCs, JEOC, and SOC.	OES, EMSA, DHS	SEMS and RIMS

AREA: SEMS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Need to establish an agency departmental operations center (DOC) to provide better response capability.	Obtain additional funding to enable state agencies to establish DOCs or enhance existing DOCs.	OES, FEMA, state agencies (to collectively address funding requirements)	Logistics
Operational area	Still need to work on integration of public works into incident command structure.	Public works representation needs to be emphasized in the ICS structure. (During the wildfires, public works played a vital role in evacuations.)	OES, local agencies	ICS structure
Operational areas	Integration of all local and regional organizations into the SEMS process to ensure resources are deployed appropriately.	All disaster response staff should be trained in usage of SEMS protocols and procedures to ensure that resources are prioritized and deployed appropriately. The EOC should be aware of all mutual aid requests and authorize deployments.	OES, OAs, local disaster staff, volunteer agencies	SEMS
Operational area	Changing the “name” of an emergency during the response phase causes RIMS to lose previously existing RIMS reports.	Advance notification by the SOC of RIMS changes would enable all RIMS users to prepare their Plans sections for contingencies in the reporting process. OES should have IT staff look into the possibility of programming RIMS to allow merging previously existing RIMS reports under a new disaster name or allow OAs to access the previous reports so that they do not lose information.	OES	RIMS

AREA: MUTUAL AID

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency (law enforcement)	<p>Some state agencies are part of the mutual aid system, but do not participate frequently in mutual aid. Therefore, they have problems functioning smoothly within the system.</p> <p>Mutual aid issues have been discussed by the Blue Ribbon Commission.</p>	Work on training/exercises and coordination issues. Ensure state agency staff have ongoing SEMS training.	OES, mutual aid participants, local government	Mutual aid
State agencies	Over the years, state agencies involved in providing mutual aid have had difficulties obtaining access into disaster areas for their personnel. This problem surfaced again during the wildfires for at least a couple of state agencies.	<p>This is a multi-faceted area. Items to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explore the option of a standard identification system for emergency response personnel. • Ensure staff are trained on “behind the line ”safety and protocols. • Ensure that protective measures for personnel accessing disaster areas are in place. 	OES and other state agencies	Mutual Aid

AREA: MUTUAL

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agencies	Dispatch of resources via county MOU agreements with a state agency's local field offices. Many state resources were dispatched locally without notifying the department's central operations center.	State agencies providing first responder assistance need to develop their own internal statewide activation and notification protocols for deploying state resources. Of particular concern are events that become regional in scope.	CDC, OES, and other state agencies with field offices located throughout the state.	Mutual aid
Operational area	Conditional deployment of resources to Incidents. Fire drawdown exceeded 150 percent of maximum at the height of the siege because local firefighters had been sent to provide mutual aid to other counties.	Concepts of conditional deployment, emergency demobilization, and regional resource deployment approval should be reviewed for inclusion in the Master Mutual Aid Agreement.	OES, CDF, local agencies	Mutual aid
Operational area	Interfacing special districts with EOC and ICS. One fire agency requested assistance of an air quality district, but could not get response.	Address special districts in SEMS literature. Incorporate special districts in training and exercises. Note: Since there are several different types of special districts, different scenarios and special district capabilities will need to be considered.	OES and local governments, special districts	Planning

AREA: MUTUAL AID

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
Operational area	Problems with resources management and prioritization. MACS did not seem to analyze or prioritize resource needs. South Operations seemed to be behind in filling resource requests and were not aware of order status at times.	Evaluate prioritization process and ordering procedures/methodology.	OES, CDF, local government agencies	Mutual aid
Operational areas	The fires overtaxed local governments' response capabilities in the Region.	Plan a large-scale exercise to stress systems at MACS Mode 4. Ensure the entire region is exercising based on a multiple area incident. Require interagency coordination between different OAs and different disciplines. May want to include mass casualty concerns in scenario.	OES, CDF, other state agencies, local government	Training (both Mutual Aid and SEMS)
Operational area	Deployed Emergency Management Mutual Aid (EMMA) personnel did not always have the necessary training and experience to fulfill EOC needs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a method to identify experienced EMMA personnel that can be inserted seamlessly into the EOC structure. • Develop standards and training for EMMA personnel. 	OES, local governments	Training

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES**

**ATTACHMENT B
AAR RECOMMENDATIONS**

AREA: FIRE OPERATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	The volume of requests during the siege exceeded the capability of the local staffing to keep up with processing the orders. MIRPS and federal ROSS do not talk to each other requiring additional time and personnel to process orders.	To solve this problem, field commanders worked around the system by either using resources on hand as best as they could or they went outside the system and ordered resources directly to the incident. This was a short-term solution. The long-term solution is to develop interoperable resource ordering systems.	OES, CDF, Federal fire agencies	Logistics
State agency	Non-federal command teams were not familiar with the federal Wildland Fire Situation Analysis (WFSA) used to make strategic decisions on specific environmental, economic and social issues related to managing and controlling wildland fires.	Train non-federal fire agencies to use WFSA to take environment factors into consideration when managing wildland fires. Federal agencies need to understand local fire agencies policy to protect life and property while gaining perimeter control of the incident.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local fire agencies	Management/Training
State agency (CDF Specific)	Improved public information centers, and providing productive roles for elected officials.	Further outreach to the media and legislative representatives.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local agencies, Media Contacts, Legislative Contacts	Communication

AREA: FIRE OPERATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Management of large multi-agency incident created span of control issues and problems related to coordination of logistics.	Larger incidents were split into two incidents to improve span of control, logistical support and to reduce the number of fires being managed by the Area Command. However, this approach required more trained ICS team members.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local fire agencies	ICS
State Agency	The MACS function was overloaded due to the requirement to support dual functions: MACS function and agency oversight. This resulted in demand for telephones, data lines and workspace for a large number of personnel. There was an under representation of those fire agencies who could not send a representative. Demand for intelligence predictions, predictive service forecasts and geographical information system products exceeded the capacity of the permanent staff of the GIS.	Keep MACS function separate from agency oversight.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local agencies	Command and management

AREA: FIRE OPERATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State Agency	Local agencies retained resources within their jurisdiction and individual fire chiefs made agreements with their counterparts to share resources on adjoining fires. Several agencies took independent action on fires that were spreading into their jurisdiction without coordinating with their neighboring jurisdictions.	Improve resource capacity to speed up resource deployment and avoid duplication of effort at the field level. CDF Agency Administrators and US Forest Service Agency Administrators from the Regional and Washington offices assisted with political issues and monitored the overall situation as it evolved and placed orders for Federal National teams to provide adequate and timely management.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local agencies	ICS and Logistics
State agency	Safety risks associated with a long siege. Mandatory work/rest cycles for firefighters were impossible to meet at times. There was an inability of some local agencies to communicate with state and federal agencies.	Separated crews based on work schedules. OES could maintain an additional cache of radios for those local agencies that can't communicate with state and federal agencies.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, Local government agencies	Logistics
State agency (CDF specific)	Public misunderstanding related to when aircraft can be appropriately used during wildland fires.	Further outreach to the media and legislative representatives to give the public a better understanding of the appropriate use of aviation resources during wildfires.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local agencies	Public information

AREA: FIRE OPERATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Need for quick up-to-date disaster related information. The incident was so large and developed so quickly that information resources were stretched too far.	Earlier activation of the Joint Information Center to disperse public information. Fire Safe Council volunteers were activated on 10/27/03 and logged over 23,000 calls in the next few weeks. Former Governor Davis and Governor Schwarzenegger initiated and facilitated daily conference calls with wildland fire officials and elected officials as well as with the press corps.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local fire agencies	Public Information
State agency	Public and legislative representatives should have a better understanding of State and Local Fire Agencies' need to adhere to safety standards and procedures.	Further outreach to the media and legislative representatives. Further inter-agency training on agency specific operational requirements.	OES, CDF, federal fire agencies, local fire agencies, Media Contact Sources, Legislative Contacts	Communication

AREA: FIRE OPERATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	<p>Cost Sharing: Cost of fighting the fires due to the number of fires involved, number of buildings lost and number of homes threatened posed a significant fiscal issue for local jurisdictions. The time required to file grant applications for Fire Management Assistance Grants threatened to overwhelm the local government administrative staff.</p>	<p>Incident commanders relied on established cost share policy and procedures. Orders for resources were made based on operational need and fiscal issues were handled using normal business practice.</p> <p>State wildland agency administration developed a Cost Apportionment Process specific for this siege. This agreement provided consistency to the cost apportionment process and simplified the process when possible.</p> <p>OES worked with FEMA on FMAG workload; the two agencies agreed to file one major disaster request application for all of the fires in Southern California</p>	OES, CDF, FEMA, Local Government Fire Agencies	Finance
Operational area	<p>There was a lack of safety gear to protect law enforcement during evacuations.</p>	<p>OES should look into the feasibility of establishing caches of equipment to assist local government during a disaster.</p>	OES, OHS, CDF, local government	Logistics

AREA: STATE AGENCY PLANS/PLANNING

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	State agencies need to develop and/or rework their plans to reflect SEMS and Mutual Aid processes.	OES should work with state agencies on plans and procedures, especially those reflecting Mutual Aid and SEMS. (Note: OES is identifying agencies that require planning assistance.)	OES and selected state agencies.	State Planning
State agency	State agencies need to be aware of other state/federal agencies' statutory authorities and responsibilities. Likewise, operational areas need to be aware of state statutory authorities and responsibilities.	Include information on statutory authorities and responsibilities in planning documents and training courses. Conduct periodic refresher training.	OES, other state agencies	State planning/training
State agency	Debris management was a key issue during this event. There needs to be a State Debris Management Plan in 2004. This plan should help resolve some conflicting needs, i.e. cost recovery (FEMA) and protection of public health, safety and the environment (Cal/EPA).	Complete the State Debris Management Plan in 2004.	OES as lead, with support from other federal and state agencies	State planning

AREA: STATE PLANS/PLANNING

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	<p>There are still significant gaps in animal care planning, such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Counties need to develop and practice their animal plans. This should include linkage with law enforcement and fire agencies. Also need to address possible co-location of human and animal shelters. <p>More work with non-profit animal care groups to ensure they integrate into disaster response.</p>	<p>Have state OES assist CDFA with networking with counties to show benefits of developing plans. Develop oversight protocols and training programs for non-profit animal groups.</p>	CDFA, other state agencies, OES	State planning
State agency	<p>A decision was made not to open the Joint Emergency Operations Center (JEOC) previously used by California's medical/health agencies during other events. Staff found that despite conference calls, actual physical co-location could have better facilitated information sharing.</p>	Encourage co-location of the medical and public health response.	DHS, EMSA, OES	State planning

AREA: STATE AGENCY PLANS/PLANNING

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key players	Category
State agencies	<p>EMSA and DHS have identified key areas in medical, health, and mental health areas that require additional work and inclusion in plans and procedures. Key areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JEOC activation • Staffing (at all levels) • Mental health integration with other agencies • Integration of DMAT into incident management teams • Coordination with Red Cross at local level • Pharmaceuticals • Information flow, including with Health and Human Services • Medical facility evacuations • Ambulance Mutual Aid 	<p>Review recommendations contained in the EMSA AAR, DHS AAR, and Mental Health AAR that require joint agency planning and implementation. Develop implementation strategy.</p>	EMSA, DHS, Mental Health, OES	State planning

AREA: STATE AGENCY PLANS/PLANNING

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
Operational areas	Rapid spread of the fires. Those areas with effective brush clearance programs experienced less loss of life and structures.	Develop statewide vegetation management guidance. (Note: The Blue Ribbon Commission is also looking at vegetation management issues.)	CDF, local fire departments, other state agencies, OES	Planning

AREA: LOCAL PLANS/PLANNING

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Planning shortfalls were encountered by local agencies in the areas of mental health services for disaster victims and responders, transportation for the elderly and disabled, and providing accessible restrooms for the disabled in evacuation centers.	Local government should work on planning on providing mental health services and the particular needs of the elderly and disabled. Some of these issues are also state and federal concerns.	Local government, OES, FEMA and selected state agencies.	Joint local, federal, and state planning
Operational areas	Need to develop plans for wildland/urban interface areas that would pre-identify staging areas, access routes, potential evacuation routes, etc. This could include use of “local area planning groups” that are multi-agency taskforces to develop and maintain such plans. Some work has been done in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties and helped with the quick evacuation of the Arrowhead Area.	Establish statewide guidelines for wildland/urban interface plans. Encourage development of planning groups/taskforces to develop these plans.	OES, CDF, local government agencies	Joint local, state, and federal planning

AREA: LOCAL PLANS/PLANNING

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
Operational areas	Need to integrate emergency management staff from adjacent jurisdictions into EOCs when both jurisdictions face a common disaster. This will facilitate rapid intelligence sharing and more effective mutual aid.	Examine EOC activation protocol and coordination process to allow emergency management staff from adjacent jurisdictions to be incorporated into EOC. Additional comment (from Southern OES Region staff): OES, along with OAs, should develop communications protocols, such as conference calls and Flash RIMS messaging, to facilitate intelligence sharing and interagency coordination.	Local government agencies, OES	Joint planning
Operational area	Lack of integration of law enforcement representatives in the EOC and Incident Command Post (ICP).	Recognize the need to include law enforcement in the ICP structure and to quickly assimilate law agency representatives into the ICP and EOC and include in all relevant briefings. Provide training to support integration.	Local government, OES	Training
Operational area	Need to integrate state agencies with field response capabilities, i.e. CDF, Caltrans and CHP, into the EOC.	Fire, CHP, and Caltrans representatives should be co-located at each EOC and ICP if requested. Note: This may present a staffing problem unless identified early in the planning process.	OES, CHP, CDF, Caltrans, other state agencies, local government agencies.	Training and planning

AREA: FEDERAL/STATE COORDINATION

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agencies	<p>There was confusion between the roles of the REOC and the DFO during this event. The DFO initiated recovery activities while a heavy response effort (supported in part by the REOC) was still ongoing. This confusion made it difficult for state agency personnel to determine their appropriate roles during the overlapping response and recovery period. Several state and local agencies noted that the transition from response to recovery was too soon. Another concern was the resumption of response activities due to flooding and mudflows.</p>	<p>Plans and procedures for the DFO and REOC need to be developed with appropriate input from key stakeholders to address transition issues (response to recovery, secondary disasters arising from the initial disaster, etc.). Among the items suggested was the development of a “Multi-Agency Support Group “(MASG)” to coordinate policy issues with local government during the recovery phase. (If developed, need to define role of the MASG.)</p> <p>There needs to be training to support these plans and procedures. Training should include SEMS training for federal personnel.</p>	OES, FEMA, with input from other state and federal partners	Interagency coordination
State agency	Timely distribution of the names of the FCO and SCO.	OES should provide participating state agencies with the names of the FCO and SCO as the DFO is being readied for opening.	OES, FEMA	Administrative Improvements

AREA: FEDERAL/STATE COORDINATION

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Timely distribution of disaster declaration.	OES should automatically send CDSS and other involved state agencies a copy of the Governor's request and the President's Declaration of Emergency	OES, FEMA	
State agency	Some state agencies were not able to staff the DFO adequately so they were not able to attend FEMA/state meetings to obtain updated status reports.	State agencies need to make every effort to have staff participate in FEMA/State meetings and other key meetings to keep them updated on any necessary changes that may impact their program and future staffing needs.	OES, other state agencies, FEMA	Staffing
State agency	Location of LACs. Local government was not consulted on the location of LACs within their communities.	Develop a process to permit participating state and local agency input, when practical, on selecting LAC locations.	OA and local government, with possible input from other key players.	Logistics

AREA: FEDERAL/STATE COORDINATION

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	<p>There were major problems requesting federal assistance for clearing debris basins in San Bernardino County:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which program authority should it be under? (final resolution: PL84-99). • Obtaining the Governor's signature on the letter requesting PL84-99. • Transitioning from the PL84-99 emergency response to a FEMA Mission Assignment. 	<p>Develop a set of instructions regarding clearing debris basins. These should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidelines clarifying program options among the USACE PL84-99, FEMA HMGP, FEMA PA or NRCS program authority. • A streamlined version of the Governor's Action Request (GAR) process. • Procedures for transition from the PL84-99 to FEMA Mission Assignment. <p>(See also discussion of Debris Plan.)</p>	OES, FEMA, DWR, USACE	Recovery
Operational area	A private organization sent a survey team to a LAC to question applicants. Some of the questions were inappropriately personal and confidential.	All organizations dealing with disaster victims should be funneled through the REOC and/or DFO for approval before being allowed to approach disaster victims.	OES, FEMA	Recovery

AREA: VOLUNTEERS AND DONATIONS MANAGEMENT

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Some local governments were not familiar with the capabilities of various volunteer organizations. Therefore, these organizations were not used appropriately or at all. Of particular concern were the CERT teams.	Local governments need to become familiar with the capabilities of voluntary organizations so that they can be utilized during all four phases of disaster management. Likewise, organizations should inform local government about the services they provide.	OES, GOSERV, volunteer organizations, local government	Training
State agency	CERT teams have a capability to support the first responder response during wild land fires, but need appropriate training.	CERT training should be expanded to include support to the wild land fire response and to supplement the first responder response and help mitigate the devastating effects of wildfires.	OES, GOSERV, volunteer organizations, local government	Training
State agency	Government at various levels had difficulty tracking donated goods and services, including volunteers who volunteer their time.	Develop/establish a database management tool capable of tracking available donations, including volunteers who volunteer their time.	OES, GOSERV, volunteer organizations, government at all levels	Information technology
State agency	Need a central donations management clearinghouse for animal issues, either at the state or the OA level to collect the donations/cash received at any incident	Set up a “foundation” (such as CVMA or UC Davis) to collect financial donations, and then distribute based on participation.	CDFA, UCD, CVMA, and other volunteer organizations	Funds and donated goods management

AREA: VOLUNTEERS AND DONATIONS MANAGEMENT

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
Operational area	Lack of recognition of volunteers by law enforcement. Livestock evacuations were delayed because CHP did not recognize the volunteer passes that gave them clearance into the area.	Ensure that volunteer organizations are represented in EOCs and that field organizations are aware of their deployment. Need to establish procedures for giving volunteers access to disaster restricted areas. This may include specialized identification cards.	OES, CHP, local government	Training and planning

AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	San Diego fires knocked out radio repeaters and cell phone capabilities in some key areas at critical times.	State agencies may need to re-evaluate their current communications capabilities.	OES, DGS, CDF, and other state agencies; the Public Safety Radio Strategic Planning Committee (PSRSC)	Communications
State agency	Coordination of communication resources among federal, state, and local agencies	Communications incident response methods and responsibilities among federal, state, and local agencies should be determined prior to emergencies and reviewed on a regular basis	OES, FEMA, other state, federal, and local agencies	Communications
State agency	Some agency personnel lacked a working knowledge of communications systems, so they were unaware of the potential for outages.	Each agency should have staff with an operational and technical knowledge of its communications system(s) to predict potential communications outages before they occur.	OES, FEMA, other state, federal, and local agencies	Communications
Operational area	Field communications was difficult at times when the radio system could not keep up with the rapid spread of the fire.	OES should investigate the use of a statewide radio system using advanced technological equipment	OES, DGS	Interoperable communications

AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	<p>There was a need to access resources from other states. The process was at times complicated.</p> <p>Discussed by the Blue Ribbon Commission.</p>	California should review possible involvement in the EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact).	California and adjacent states; FEMA.	Interstate coordination

AREA: ACCESSIN FEDERAL RESOURCES

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	<p>The Northern Command was not familiar with SEMS and RIMS. Attempts to access the Predator (UAV) were not successful due to the cumbersome nature of the request channel for federal assets.</p> <p>A similar problem arose in connection to military firefighting equipped aviation assets.</p> <p>Discussed by the Blue Ribbon Commission.</p>	<p>The request to utilize federal (military) assets needs to be streamlined into a clear and concise method of approval and deployment.</p> <p>Currently all requests must go through the USFS ordering process then to Washington, D.C.</p>	<p>OES; California National Guard; DOD; FEMA; NORTHCOM, among others</p> <p>CDF</p>	State and federal coordination

AREA: FINANCIAL ISSUES

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Volunteer Centers of California have not been reimbursed for their actions during the response and recovery efforts of the fire.	Explore ways in which volunteer organizations can appropriately be reimbursed.	OES, GOSERV, FEMA, volunteer organizations	Reimbursement
State agency	CERT training is the only program that provides grassroots disaster preparedness education that helps prevent citizens from becoming victims. More communities need to have CERT training so there will be fewer victims to respond to in the event of a disaster.	There should be dedicated funds set aside from the Citizen Corps grant that specifically address the training and preparation of CERT team members.	GOSERV, FEMA	Funding for training
State agency	Impact to the environment in the 5 operational areas is significant. They will continue to be at risk for soil erosion, mud and debris flows and flooding for the next 3-5 years or until the denuded watershed slopes grow back sufficient vegetation.	There may be a need to address enhanced funding for agencies that may be involved in flood fighting in Southern California as a result of the wildfires.	OES, DWR, DOF, CCC, DFG, CDF, DPR, CDF, FEMA	Funding

AREA: FINANCIAL ISSUES

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Difficulties in obtaining reimbursements for fire response costs.	Develop protocol for gathering information regarding reimbursements.	OES, FEMA, CDF, local agencies	Financial tracking
Operational area	Some difficulties arose in the financial process when the fire was converted from a “FMAG” to a “federal disaster.”	Use a financial officer early on in the disaster to track expenses to ease the conversion from FMAG to FEMA funding.	OES, FEMA, local government	Financial tracking

AREA: MISCELLANEOUS

Recommended by	Problem Statement/Issue	Recommended Action	Key Players	Category
State agency	Managers need to more effectively use California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA) resources to resolve issues involving utilities companies during the emergency response, recovery, and mitigation phases.	Provide field staff with training that includes information on the resources that CUEA has available and how to integrated and coordinate with CUEA.	CUEA, OES, other state agencies, and FEMA	Training/planning

RESPONSE SUMMARY

The following chart summarizes the wide array of state agencies and departments activities during the Southern California fires. It reflects the various mutual aid systems (fire and rescue, law enforcement, medical), as well as other state response capabilities.

Note: Agencies and organizations were not asked to provide specific information on personnel and equipment deployment. If available, this information has been included in the matrix. N/A= data not available, not submitted.

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
California Conservation Corps (CCC)	Firefighting operations, support activities, and management oversight	700 total personnel, including headquarters coordination staff and support staff	60 crew vehicles, 18 vehicles for agency representatives, Type 2 firefighting equipment
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF)	Responded to 14 extended attack fires that burned for two weeks. Coordinated with other state, federal, and local fire agencies to mount the response to the fire siege. The total state/local/federal commitment involved approximately 14,000 personnel, 1500 fire engines, 80 helicopters and 180 dozers.	At the height of the incident, CDF had 6,219 personnel assigned to the fires.	At height of event: Engines-322 (96%*); Crews- 196 (98%) Air Tankers- 15 (71%) Air tactical- 6 (46%) Helicopters- 5 (66%) Dozers- 40 (69%) * () Reflect % of total CDF assets committed
California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS)	Representatives at incident command posts; traffic control during fires; highly accelerated restoration projects to reopen highways.	N/A	N/A

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA)	Activated the agency Emergency Management Advisory Committee (ERMAC); support to the OES State Operations Center (SOC) and Disaster Field Office; provided public information on health effects, debris management, and hazardous materials management.	N/A	N/A
California Highway Patrol	Public protection, patrolling evacuated areas, emergency information dissemination, provided evacuation assistance, helped maintain law and order.	Spent 23,000 hours of regular and overtime on disaster-related law enforcement duties.	CHP vehicles
California National Guard (CNG) (State Military Department)	Aviation support for fire suppression; command and control; public affairs; liaison to other organizations.	369 personnel; 1,377 Service Member Days (SMDs)	12 helicopters; 2 C-130's w/ MAFFS; maintenance equipment and fuel trucks
Department of Aging	Coordinated with 33 local Area Agencies on Aging (AAA) to determine impact of fires on seniors and adults with disabilities. Information from AAAs was consolidated and provided to state agencies and FEMA. Disseminated information from various sources on department web site.	8 personnel (The department's Disaster Team at department headquarters.)	Existing departmental resources
Department of Corrections (CDC)	Provided firefighting support at request of OES. Many CDC resources also used locally in accordance with existing county/CDC MOUs.	<p>Dispatched by DEOC: 16- Fire captains; 1 strike team leader</p> <p>Dispatched per MOUs: 5 – Fire captains; 6 inmates</p>	<p>Dispatched by DEOC: 5- Type 2 Engines;</p> <p>Dispatched per MOUs: 3-Type 1 1-Type 2</p>

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
Department of Fish and Game (DFG)	Supported law enforcement activities using department law enforcement officers. Department support staff assisted with this effort.	Field officers and support staff logged over 286 hours of overtime.	Department vehicles
Department of Food and Agriculture	Provided support in two key areas: animal care and evacuation and providing use of state fairs facilities.	8 personnel from Food and Agriculture; in addition 5 CARES members (volunteers)	7 state fairgrounds located in Southern California
Department of Health Services	Oversight of situation analysis related to: water quality, medical facilities status, public health hazards, potential radiological hazards and birth/death records assistance for fire victims. Activation of the Department Emergency Operations Center (DEOC), Richmond Laboratory Emergency Operations Center (RLEOC), and staff to the SOC.	Over 25 staff drawn from 6 department divisions	N/A
Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), Division of Occupational Safety and Health	Participated in SOC and DFO. Provided limited assistance at CDF command posts. Provided occupational safety and health monitoring and training at burn sites. Used DIR web site to make available fact sheets related to safety and health protection of responders and recovery workers.	20 staff	Industrial hygiene sampling equipment for air and material sample testing.
Department of Insurance	Activated department Emergency Response Unit. Supported REOC .	N/A	Laptops and computers and pagers
Department of Justice (DOJ)	Provided support to San Diego Police Department in securing the Scripps Ranch Community by providing static traffic control points and roving units.	24 agents and supervisors from various DOJ bureaus	N/A

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
Department of Mental Health	Mobilization of department disaster response team; Organization of mutual aid to assist county mental health departments	4-6 personnel	N/A
Department of Social Services (DSS)	Provided support to Health and Human Services Volunteer Emergency Services Team (VEST) for the Care and Shelter Branch, Southern REOC. Six VEST personnel were deployed to the REOC.	10 staff at DSS department operations center (DOC).	Equipment in the DRCs
Department of Parks and Recreation	Operated a Departmental Operations Center (DOC); provided staff at the SOC. Department peace officers assisted in law enforcement operations, including command and control, patrol and enforcement of closures, evacuation procedures, and search and rescue missions. Department firefighters assisted with fire services.	90 personnel That included: 15 Headquarters staff at DOC; 2 agency representatives to SOC; 29 State Park peace officers; 2 firefighters; 58 support staff	Type 1 fire engine; Type 6 Brush truck; loaders; chippers; grader, water truck; generators; chain saws; cell phones; pick up trucks (4-wheel)
Department of Water Resources (DWR)	Provided technical assistance at request of OES; provided modified flood fight training; identified debris basin concerns and issues; scheduled and conducted flood preparedness meetings (in anticipation of possible mudflows); assessed the status of the State Water Project to ensure source water was available for firefighting and other needs.	See Response detail	See Response detail

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA)	Staffed medical/health branches at the State Operations Center (SOC) and Southern REOC. Provided input to decision-making process at SOC. Worked with DHS as part of “virtual” Joint Emergency Operations Center (JEOC). Conducted conference calls to coordinate response efforts. Collaborated with DHS to provide the public with information on a variety of issues. Coordinated with CDF regarding the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATS)	N/A	N/A
Office of Emergency Services	Activated the Southern Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC) and State Operations Center (SOC) in support of the Operational Areas (OAs) impacted by the fires. Coordinated support activities with state agencies and departments.	160 (10/03) 267 (11/03)	102 Fire engines and 5 water tenders; equipment in operations centers, communications equipment.
Office of Service and Volunteerism (GOSERV)	Provided staff to support the State Operations Center (SOC), the Southern Regional Operations Center (REOC), and Disaster Field Office (DFO). Supported the donations management function and opened a Departmental Operations Center (DOC) to coordinate the volunteer response.	7 personnel	N/A

RESPONSE ACTIVITIES -- OPERATIONAL AREAS

Los Angeles Operational Area

Description:

Los Angeles County Operational Area (OA) was involved in two separate fires during the Southern California Firestorms of 2003. The Verdale Fire started in the early afternoon of October 24, 2003 near the community of Santa Clarita. Due to the location of the fire, Los Angeles County and Ventura County entered into a unified command and agreed to share resources between the fires and better facilitate their management. It quickly burned into Ventura County by spotting across Highway 126 and spread to Highways 118 and 23. On October 25, 2003, the Chief Officers of LA County and Ventura County Fire Departments made a strategic decision to split the fire at Highway 126 and created a second incident command. North of the highway the fire continued to be known as the Verdale Fire, while south of Highway 126, it became the Simi Fire. Fortunately, the county vegetation clearance and construction standards proved to be very successful. These ordinances saved subdivisions and allowed residents to shelter in place rather than evacuate. The Simi Fire was finally declared 100 percent contained on November 2, 2003 and extinguished on November 4, 2003, after burning 108,204 acres. At the peak of the fire, 1,575 firefighters were assigned to the Simi Fire, 37 residences were destroyed, another 278 structures were destroyed, but no lives were lost.

On October 26, 2003, the Grand Prix Fire in San Bernardino County began to spread in rapidly in all directions due to the Santa Ana Winds. The westward spread of the fire threatened Claremont and Mt. Baldy in Los Angeles County. In addition, the Grand Prix's westward push was threatening the Angeles National Forest. These threats prompted the Los Angeles Chief and U.S. Forest Service to split off the western branch of the Grand Prix to create a separate fire called the Padua Fire. In addition, the Chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department emptied fire stations in order to move fire engines to protect the cities of Claremont and La Verne. There was a delay in receiving resources by a system that was 24 to 48 hours behind actual operations of the incident. As a result, a new Federal national Team was ordered for the Padua Fire. The team was able to adjust strategies and take advantage of natural fire barriers and older burned areas as the Santa Ana winds abated and marine airflow returned. By October 29, entire branches of the Grand Prix/Padua Fires were contained and firefighting resources were reassigned. By the time the Padua Fire was contained on October 30, 10,446 acres had burned. At the peak of the fire, 773 firefighters were assigned to the Padua Fire.

Period of Los Angeles Operational Area commitment: 10/24/2003 – 11/2/2004

Personnel: At the peak of the Simi Fire, 1,575 firefighters were assigned to this fire. At the peak of the Padua Fire, 773 firefighters were assigned to this fire.

Equipment: Not available.

Riverside Operational Area

Description:

Riverside OA experienced two separate fires during the Southern California Firestorms of 2003. The Pass Fire started about a half mile from the city of Moreno Valley, the Pass Fire, on October 21, 2003. By the time of its containment several days later, it had burned 2387 acres. The fire fighting response required the combined forces of over 800 personnel. Resources committed to the fire suppression efforts included Federal, State, County, Local Government and Tribal firefighting agencies. By the time the fire was extinguished, five residences and 21 out buildings were destroyed. The estimated loss of residential structures was \$1,259,524 and \$473,600 of other miscellaneous structures. No loss of life occurred.

The second fire, the Mountain Fire, started in an area northeast of Lake Skinner within the communities of Sage and Rancho California on October 26, 2003. By the time of its containment, it had burned 10,331 acres. Resources committed to this firefighting effort include Federal, State, County, Local Government and Tribal firefighting agencies. The firefighting response required the combined forces of over 697 personnel. Steep inaccessible terrain, high temperatures, low humidity, high gusty Santa Ana winds hampered fire suppression efforts and many structures located within the fire area. By the time the Pass Fire was extinguished, 21 residences, over 41 vehicles and 40 outbuildings were destroyed. The estimated cost of property loss is \$4.5 million. No loss of life occurred.

Period of Riverside Operational Area commitment: 10/21/03 to 11/14/03.

Personnel: PASS FIRE: Required the combined forces of over 800 firefighting personnel, including federal, state, county, local government and tribal firefighting agency personnel. Law Mutual Aid: 68 sworn personnel for four days to San Bernardino; Fire Mutual Aid: 600 plus personnel rotated out of the county during the fires; Mental Health Mutual Aid: 2 person team to San Bernardino for three days; Emergency Management Mutual Aid: one person to San Bernardino EOC for seven days; and additional fire support from Palm Springs for aircraft at Hemet-Ryan Field for five days.

MOUNTAIN FIRE: Required the combined forces of 697 personnel, including federal, state, county, local government and tribal firefighting personnel. 35 fire stations in Riverside County were emptied to support the initial attack on the fire. The CDF Riverside Chief requested private sector ambulance companies to cover the open fire stations and maintain a basic level of emergency medical service to the public. Evacuations were made successfully using Riverside County sheriff personnel. The local sheriff was able to re-open roads within 36 hours of the closure and evacuation.

Riverside Operational Area (continued)

Equipment: At the peak of the Pass Fire, 86 fire engines, 4 helicopters, 48 overhead, and 2 dozers were assigned to the fire. At the peak of the Mountain Fire, 54 fire engines, 6 helicopters, 99 overhead, and 16 dozers were assigned to the fire.

(Source: Riverside County Fire and fact-finding meetings)

San Bernardino Operational Area

Description:

San Bernardino Operational Area (OA) experienced a prolonged, intense and unique set of circumstances while responding to two large wildland fires (Grand Prix and Old Fires) between October 21 and November 11, 2003. The EOC was at Level III activation 24 hours a day for 21 straight days. San Bernardino's previous participation in the Mountain Area Safety Taskforce (MAST) was a significant benefit to the OA during this fire event. The continued presence and support of the CAO particularly during this large sustained operation cannot be overemphasized. Elected officials were also very supportive and available during this fire siege. Resource needs and issues crossing jurisdictional lines were more easily addressed and resolved with the assistance of the CAO and elected officials. In addition, the presence of County Counsel in the EOC was a significant assistance in the prompt preparation of the disaster declaration and related requests to state and federal officials, as well as drafting and executing necessary Executive Orders to address specific response needs.

Grand Prix Fire: San Bernardino first became involved with the wildland fires on October 21st when the Grand Prix Fire began in northern Fontana. First arriving firefighters reported a two-acre fire burning in old brush burning with a rapid rate of spread fanned by southwest wind. The temperatures were hot and the humidity extremely low. Fire spotting ahead of the main fire was occurring and within one hour of the start of the fire, it was already reported to be over 100 acres and moving into 45 year-old brush. Veteran firefighters recognized that this fire had extreme fire behavior as it threatened the communities of Lytle Creek to the north, Devore to the east and thousands of homes in the foothill communities to the south. It grew to 1,958 acres overnight. By October 23rd, FMAG was approved for the Grand Prix Fire.

On October 25th, Santa Ana Winds pushed the fire further out of control and beyond the scope of the WFSA strategy prompting a transition to the Federal National Team. The Unified Command was able to use the Mountain Area Safety Taskforce advance planning efforts to set critical strategic goals. With the increase in fire activity throughout the southern region, the team decided that the resource ordering system could not keep up with the large number of resource orders being requested and deployed. Their response was to adjust their strategic objectives to a level they could accomplish with the resources on hand. The Grand Prix's westward push was threatening to spread in to Angeles National Forest. The Chief Officers of the U.S. Forest Service and Los Angeles Fire Department chose to split off from the Grand Prix along the Angeles/San Bernardino Forest boundaries and to create a separate incident, the Padua Fire. The team was then able to adjust strategies and take advantage of natural fire barriers and older burned areas as the Santa Ana Winds abated and marine airflow returned. By October 29, entire branches of the grand Prix/Padua Fire were contained and firefighting resources were reassigned or assisted on the west flank of the Old Fire near Silver Lake. By the time, the Grand Prix Fire was extinguished, 69,894 acres had burned, 2500 firefighters had been deployed to the fire, 194 residences were destroyed and 61 other structures were lost. However, no lives were lost during this fire siege.

San Bernardino Operational Area (continued)

Old Fire: The second of San Bernardino's wildland fires began on October 25th in Waterman Canyon above the City of San Bernardino. Strong gusty Santa Ana Winds spread the fire rapidly downhill threatening Arrowhead Springs resort and the community of Del Rosa. These winds pushed the fire west and east of Waterman Canyon. Firefighters were confronted by a dangerously fast moving blaze with major spotting. Ignited palm fronds acted like torches of fire in the wind, igniting numerous spot fires that threatened and burned homes in its path. Two civilians died during the first evening. It was also burning up canyon driven by steep terrain and dry vegetation as the humidity dropped to six percent. This northern spread up the canyon became a problem later when the Santa Ana Winds subsided and the prevailing west winds pushed the fire into the dead and dying and diseased forests of the San Bernardino National Forest and the communities located there.

Period of San Bernardino OA commitment: 10/21/03 to 1/9/04.

Personnel: Not available

Equipment: Not available

San Diego Operational Area

Description:

San Diego County Operational Area (OA) was involved in three separate fires during the Southern California Firestorms of 2003. Prior to the start of the first fire, San Diego fire agencies had sent many resources north to help with the fires that had started the previous four days. Fortunately, CDF and San Diego fire agencies recognized that the burning conditions within San Diego County were ripe for a large fire and issued direction that all stations should stay staffed with the remaining resources and no further assignments were accepted for fires outside the county.

The firestorms in San Diego County resulted in 375,971 acres burned. At the height of the fires, 6,625 personnel were assigned to the fires. A total of 2,454 residential structures, 24 commercial properties and 763 outbuildings were destroyed. Approximately 3,000 large animals (horses and livestock) and 500 small animals were evacuated. There were 17 fatalities, including one firefighter.

Cedar Fire

On the evening of October 25, 2003, the Cedar Fire began in the vicinity of Cedar Creek and Pine Hills Road west of Julian. It originated in a remote location of San Diego County and occurred too late in the evening to safely use aircraft. It became the largest fire to ever burn in California, tragically killing 14 people and destroying thousands of structures. Extreme fire behavior sent walls of flames down upon communities too fast for many people to get out of the way. At the peak of the burning it grew at a rate of 12,000 acres per hour. Two command teams split the fire to establish an improved span of control. Social and political pressures became problematic, reportedly affecting the Incident Commanders' ability to make timely decisions and focus on the task at hand.

The fight continued as the wind shifted to a westerly and the fire headed towards Cuyamaca and Julian. Firefighters worked long hours, not leaving their posts until relief finally arrived. Firefighters were working under extreme conditions and risking their lives to save people and their homes. One firefighter from Novato was trapped and overrun while defending homes in the Julian area and three others were injured. Winds shifted again so the fire was now burning toward the old Pines Fire (2002). The recent burn area allowed firefighters to use the lack of heavy fuels as a firebreak where the Cedar Fire could be stopped effectively. Finally damp weather entered the area and assisted in containing the fire. At the height of the fire 4,275 firefighters were assigned to the fire. The Cedar Fire destroyed 2,232 homes, 566 outbuildings, 22 businesses and 273,246 acres before being extinguished. Fourteen people, including one fireman, lost their lives while the fire was burning uncontrollable.

San Diego Operational Area (continued)

Paradise Fire

The Paradise Fire began on October 26th north of the Cedar Fire near the communities of Valley Center, Escondido and La Jolla. It was declared the #3 priority fire behind the Cedar and Old fires. The incident command team experienced a significant delay in receiving resources due to the large number of fires burning in southern California. Life safety was the primary focus of all strategic and tactical decisions due to the drastically limited resources. Perimeter control was a secondary concern until additional resources became available. The fire burned blocks of homes. As a result of limited resources, the command team went outside the ordering system to get equipment. In addition, local tribal governments provided resources. The Paradise Fire was included as the San Diego Unified Area Coordination Team was established on October 30. This Area Coordination Team adjusted resources for the fires within their area. At the height of the fire, 2,222 firefighters were assigned to the Paradise Fire, while 221 residences were destroyed, 2 commercial structures burned, 192 outbuildings were destroyed, and 56,700 acres were burned. In addition, two people lost their lives as a result of the fire.

Otay Fire

The Otay Fire began October 26th in the Mine canyon area on Otay Mountain that was south of the Cedar Fire and east of the city of San Diego. Like its sister fires, Cedar and Paradise, it resulted from the Santa Ana wind. The initial attack CDF commander recognized the value of an existing BLM International fuel break and used a major burnout strategy to successfully suppress the fire with very limited resources. At the height of the fire, 138 firefighters were assigned to this fire. Only one residence was destroyed, 5 outbuildings were destroyed and 45,971 acres burned.

Period of San Diego Operational Area commitment: 10/25/2003 – 11/1/2004 (deactivation of EOC)

Personnel: 5,754 personnel were assigned to the fires.
Public Health nurses
County Road Crew to clear North peak Road
Two teams of mental health clinicians
Escorts for M. E. to Barona
Information Technology Coordinator for E Team

Equipment: 9 generators
10 emergency animal evacuation rigs
800 mhz radios for medical personnel
2 Ambulances
Six RCS radios programmed for EMS
Three bulldozers

The majority of this report is based on the “California Fire Siege 2003 The Story”.

Ventura Operational Area

Description:

Ventura County incurred the wrath of three major wildland fires (Piru, Verdale, and Simi) beginning on October 23, 2003. These three fires, coupled with the other major wildland fires in Southern California, tested prevention, suppression, and recovery efforts of every fire agency in Ventura County and California.

Weather conditions, combined with extreme fuel conditions experienced during this fire siege, heavily impacted the densely populated urban cities of Moorpark and Simi Valley as well as the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) areas in Ventura County. During this time period, the Simi Incident (107,568 acres) was the largest wildland fire in Ventura County. The Simi fuel bed has never burned to that magnitude. The rapid fire spread can be directly attributed to extreme weather conditions and a fuel bed that was stressed and not properly managed.

Ventura County did not suffer the same proportionate losses as other jurisdictions, but any loss is too much. Ventura's success was based upon several factors:

1. Key strategy and tactics coupled with aggressive firefighting
2. Updated building and fire codes for construction in the wildland urban interface area
3. An aggressive vegetation management program
4. Effective community education programs

It is apparent that tax dollars are not commensurate with providing a fire engine at every structure during these times and that the wildland urban interface problem is not going away anytime soon, in fact, it is expanding. The notable items are not new to the fire service and that it is paramount that government, businesses, and the public work together in order to prevent a recurrence of these fires and losses.

Period of Ventura OA commitment: October 23, 2003 through November 12, 2003 (?)

Personnel: Not available

Equipment: Not available

RESPONSE ACTIVITIES -- STATE ORGANIZATIONS

California Conservation Corps (CCC)

Description: The CCC provided firefighting support to CDF and other agencies.

Personnel and Equipment: The CCC provided 59 support crews and one Type 2 fire fighting crew and 18 agency reps during the time period of October 21 through November 9, 2003. Total number of personnel was 700 including headquarters coordination staff. Sixty crew vehicles and 18 vehicles for agency reps were used. The Type 2 crew used standard fire fighting equipment. The support crews were assigned to the kitchen, supply or facility units.

Period of California Conservation Corps Commitment: 10/21/03-02/12/04

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

California Department of Aging

Description:

The California Department of Aging (CDA) is not a first responder agency. However, CDA has an eight-member Disaster Team that has been meeting for over one year. The entire CDA Disaster Team has had SEMS training and has worked with a contractor to update a Disaster Manual that provides technical assistance and guidance for 33 local Area Agencies on Aging (AAA) that administer local programs and services for California's seniors and adults with disabilities. The CDA does not have any staff member whose sole function is to plan and respond to disasters. On Friday, October 22, the CDA sent an electronic message to the AAAs in the fire-affected areas informing them that CDA staff were available 24 hours a day if there was a need to communicate with CDA.

On Monday, October 25, the CDA Disaster Team met and decided to gather information from local AAAs, program managers and service providers to learn what impact the fires were having on seniors and adults with disabilities. This information was compiled daily and was sent to the California Health and Human Services Agency which shared it with other state agencies, including State OES. These same reports were also shared with the Federal Administration on Aging (AOA), CDA's federal partner.

The CDA did not send any staff to the fire affected areas. However, CDA did send a list of volunteers to the Department of Social Services that contained the names of six staff members who volunteered to be trained for VEST.

In addition, CDA communicated on a daily basis with the affected AAAs and their disaster coordinators. The CDA also disseminated news releases sent to them from the Department of Health Services, OES and the Governor's Office. These news releases were posted on CDA's Web sites and shared with local AAAs

CDA believes that their ongoing training is a plus. During this ongoing state fiscal crisis, they believe any money earmarked to help train agencies that are not first responders will be helpful in future crises. The CDA could use additional funding to purchase necessary equipment to establish an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located within CDA headquarters.

Period of CDA commitment: 10/20/03 to 1/5/04.

Personnel: An eight-member Disaster Team assisted 33 local AAAs by providing technical assistance and guidance as well as sharing news releases related to the Fires.

Equipment: CDA staff utilized existing departmental resources, including their website, to communicate with the 33 AAAs.

California Department of Corrections

Description: On October 27, 2003, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) contacted the California Department of Corrections (CDC) to request resources to assist with the firefighting effort in Southern California. OES requested type 1 or 11 engines accompanied by three staff members per engine. Subsequently, on October 28, five engines were made available and dispatched from several state prisons along with 15 Fire Captains, one assistant team leader, and one strike team leader.

In addition to those engines dispatched by CDC headquarters, many CDC resources were locally dispatched via county MOU agreements without notifying CDC headquarters.

The CDC was able to meet the OES request for resources. A CDC team was assembled and resources were dispatched utilizing the SEMS and ICS model. The CDC ensured appropriate fire resources were available at each institution to minimize risk to the public, CDC staff, and inmates.

Period of CDC commitment: 10/27/03 to 10/31/03.

Personnel: Staff dispatched by DEOC:

- Three Fire Captains from CMF
- Three Fire Captains from CTF
- Three Fire Captains from MCSP
- Three Fire Captains from SQ
- Two Fire Captains from PVSP
- One Fire Captain from North Kern State Prison (NKSP)
- One Fire Captain from Sierra Conservation Center (SCC)
- One Strike team leader from the California Men's Colony (CMC)

Units not centrally dispatched by CDC:

- Two Fire Captains to Kern County and Simi Valley from the California Correctional Institution (CCI)
- One Fire Captain and 2 inmates to San Diego from Centinela State Prison (CEN)
- One Fire Captain and 4 inmates to San Diego from Calipatria State Prison (CAL)
- One Fire Captain from Folsom Prison to the Cedar Fire (Called by the Mesquite Fire Department)

Equipment: Five engines were dispatched by DEOC:

- Type II from the California Medical Facility (CMF)
- Type II from the California Training Facility (CTF)
- Type II from Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP)
- Type II from San Quentin (SQ)

California Department of Corrections (continued)

Type II from Pleasant Valley State Prison (PV)

Four engines were not centrally dispatched by CDC

Type I from CCI

Type I from CEN

Type I from CAL

Type II from California Correctional Center (CCC)

One area of concern continues to be the dispatch of CDC resources by county MOU agreements. As illustrated above, many CDC resources were locally dispatched without the notification and utilization of a centralized platform within the CDC. The CDC is in the process of evaluating this continuing situation for appropriate resolution.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

Description: The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) is responsible for protecting Californians from fire, responding to emergencies, and protecting and enhancing forests, range and watershed. CDF has a firefighting force that includes 3,800 full-time fire professionals, foresters and administrative employees, 1400 seasonal firefighters, 5600 local government volunteer firefighters, 2600 Volunteers in Prevention, and 4300 inmates that provide 194 fire crews. Many of these personnel were involved in fighting the wildland fires either directly or indirectly.

Intergovernmental cooperative agreements via contract and agreements between state, federal, and local agencies allowed all the fire agencies located in California to work together to reduce the threat of fire to the public and property. Prior to the conflagration that erupted in late October 2003, state, federal and local fire agencies had been working together in an effort to address the bark beetle infestation and drought conditions that put Southern California at great risk of massive wildland fires.

CDF was instrumental in assisting counties with pre-planning activities to help prevent and or reduce the impact of potential wildland fires. Prior to the fire, CDF assisted local fire agencies with fire prevention measures, including educating the public on the need for defensible space around homes, implementing projects to reduce hazardous fuel conditions such as dead tree removal projects, and to assist with pre-planning activities, such as the creation of safe evacuation routes and safe shelter in place centers. In addition, Governor Davis authorized additional funding to deploy additional CDF resources to southern California due to the extreme fire danger.

As it turned out, October 21, 2003 proved to be the beginning of fourteen fires that ravaged southern California for a total of two weeks. State and federal fire agencies joined local fire agencies in establishing a Unified Command post and provided firefighting crews and equipment for the duration of the fire siege. Before the fire siege was over, the fires had consumed 739,597 acres and more than 5,200 structures, including 3,600 homes in the counties of Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura. Of this acreage figure, 276,956 acres burned on State Responsibility Area (SRA) land under direct protection of CDF. The total estimated suppression costs for all agencies had exceeded \$123 million. CDF's estimated share of this expense was \$55 million. Southern California had mobilized state, federal and local resources that included approximately 14,000 personnel, 1,600 fire engines, 80 helicopters, and 180 dozers to combat the various wildland fires.

CDF currently uses the FIRESCOPE adopted ICS system that was established in the early 1970s. CDF acted as the lead agency in conducting the daily MACS calls that occurred during the event.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (continued)

Period of CDF commitment: October 21, 2003 through November 5, 2003

During this same time period, CDF continued providing initial and extended attack response to new wildland fires burning on State Responsibility Areas (SRA) land statewide. During the same time period, CDF responded to a total of 1,107 SRA wildland fires statewide.

Personnel: At the height of the incident, 6,219 CDF personnel were assigned to these incidents.

Included in this personnel total was the deployment of 5 CDF Incident Command Teams (ICT) to separate incidents in the Southern California Fire Area. Two additional ICT's were held on "Hard Cover" standby for immediate deployment. The 5 committed teams were deployed as follows:

ICT #1 (IC Snell)	Paradise Fire
ICT #3 (IC Chuckles)	Mountain Fire
ICT #5 (IC Hawkins)	Cedar Fire
ICT #6 (IC Haines)	Simi Fire
ICT #9 (IC Kerrigan)	Piru Fire

Equipment: CDF operates 1,050 fire engines (370 state and 689 local government), 13 aerial ladder trucks, 60 bulldozers, five mobile communication centers and 11 mobile kitchen units. CDF contracts for another 82 engines and 12 bulldozers. CDF also operates seven Airtankers (800 gallons), 16 gallon Airtankers (1,200 gallons), nine Super Huey helicopters and 13 Air Attack Planes.

At the height of the fires, CDF had committed the following equipment and aircraft:

Engines	322 of 336 or 96 percent of available resources
Crews	196 of 200 or 98 percent of available resources
Air Tankers	15 of 21 or 71 percent of available resources
Air Tactical	6 of 13 or 46 percent of available resources
Helicopters	5 of 9 or 66 percent of available resources
Dozers	40 of 58 or 69 percent of available resources

California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA)

Description:

- Cal/EPA activated its Emergency Response Management Advisory Committee (ERMAC), which consists of representatives from each of the six Boards, Departments and Office (BDOs) within Cal/EPA. The six BDOs within Cal/EPA are the Air Resources Board (ARB), the State Water Resources Control Board and the nine Regional Boards (SWRCB), the Integrated Waste Management Board (IWMB), the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), the Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR), and the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA). The ERMAC fulfilled the Operations and Planning/Intelligence sections within SEMS for the Cal/EPA.
- Cal/EPA assigned an individual to the State Operations Center to represent all Cal/EPA BDOs while the SOC was activated. This individual coordinated the use of Agency resources using SEMS.
- Cal/EPA assigned individuals from the IWMB to the Disaster Field Office to represent the all Cal/EPA BDOs while the DFO was operational.
- Cal/EPA used the ERMAC representatives to maintain an Agency Operation Center. The ERMAC met as needed to coordinate activities and provide technical resources to State and local government when requested through the SOC. SEMS, coordinated through the SOC or DFO, was used to coordinate all resources provided to the disaster.
- Cal/EPA ERMAC conducted frequent conference calls with other State and Local agencies to coordinated support.
- The Cal/EPA Public Information Officers coordinated the release of information through the SOC and Joint Information Center (JIC).
- Cal/EPA established a Web page to post fire related guidance that had been first released through the JIC. This provided a rapid way to distribute information on health effects, debris management and hazardous materials management.

Activities of BDOs are reflected in a separate table below.

Individual BDO Activities:

ARB	10/23/03-10/30/03. Supported SOC. Coordinated with US EPA on their air sampling and data reporting. Helped coordinate air monitoring with local air pollution control districts. Prepared web page that summarized air monitoring data during event.
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California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) (continued)

SWRCB	10/28/03-2/17/04. Worked with key stakeholders to identify potential local impacts on water quality (contamination, erosion) and identified appropriate mitigation activities and best management practices to address water quality issues. Conditional Waivers for the Management and Disposal of Wildfire Debris were developed among Southern California RWQCBs for Los Angeles, Santa Ana and San Diego. Monitored compliance by discharges granted conditional waivers. Monitored landfills. Sent representatives to the DFO to participate in debris management discussions. Reviewed or developed “fact sheets” on various issues, such as animal carcass disposal, and posted this information on websites. Continued to monitor erosion and sediment control activities in all burned areas of concern.
CIWMB	11/03/03- 1/31/04. The CIWMB provided staff, representing both the CIWMB and Cal/EPA, at the Disaster Field Office in Pasadena, as well as the San Diego and the Colton field offices. Helped coordinate policy responses and provide information on the handling and proper management of debris materials such as burn ash, telephone poles, household hazardous wastes, railroad ties, auto bodies, asbestos-containing materials, fuel-contaminated soil, and animal carcasses. Developed a web site to provide recovery information to State and local agencies, and took the lead in putting together the umbrella Cal/EPA web page for the fire response, proper management of the debris materials, emergency funding, relevant regulations, etc. Processed emergency waivers requests from local enforcement agencies (LEAs) regarding the process for obtaining emergency waivers to site emergency waste management facilities, accept debris tonnage above daily permitted levels, conduct activities outside of permitted operating hours, and allow for traffic volumes to accommodate the increased tonnages.
DTSC	10/28/03-02/04/04. Technical assistance for issuance of appropriate waivers and exemptions to support activities directed at debris and waste classification, management, and disposal. Technical assistance to San Diego County in the development of a focused sampling plan to identify contaminants of concern in the burn debris and ash of impacted residences.
DPR	Fire phase: 10/25/03-11/7/03; recovery: 10/30/03-1/30/04. Participated in the Cal/EPA ERMAC.
OEHHA	10/30/03-01/20/04. Provided risk communication materials on health issues, including the “Wildfire Smoke- A Guide to Public Health Officials” and “Safe Cleanup of Fire Ash”. Responded to citizen and public health inquiries concerning health hazards from wildfire smoke and ash.

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
RESPONSE DETAIL**

ATTACHMENT D

California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) (continued)

Period of Cal/EPA commitment: 10/23/03 to present

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

California Highway Patrol

Description:

The California Highway Patrol (CHP) mobilized and deployed units to those city and county areas threatened by the quickly spreading fires to control ingress and egress around the perimeter of the fire. CHP officers were responsible for protecting the public, patrolling evacuated areas to prevent looting, disseminating emergency information to the public and emergency response agencies, and maintaining law and order. They coordinated with local police and sheriff departments to provide supplemental law enforcement during evacuation of threatened communities.

Period of CHP commitment: 10/20/03 to 11/7/03.

Personnel: The wildfires affected four CHP Divisions, which resulted in over 23,000 regular and overtime hours for uniformed and non-uniformed personnel. The CHP also activated Emergency Resource Centers in the four Divisions and at CHP Headquarters in Sacramento to assist with disaster-related law enforcement duties in the affected Operational Areas.

Equipment: CHP provided patrol vehicles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft while performing their disaster-related duties.

California National Guard (State Military Department) (CNG)

Description:

The California Department of Forestry (CDF) - through the Office of Emergency Services (OES) - requested CNG aviation support in response to the wildfires. CNG assets responded in accordance with existing CNG operations plans/procedures and the California Interagency Military Helicopter Firefighting Program. The initial support request was on 10/26/03.

In addition, the Nevada Army National Guard (ARNG) and Oregon ARNG both provided aircraft in support of the Southern California wildfire operations. This commitment required interagency coordination among the CNG, California OES, Nevada OES, Oregon OES, the respective state National Guard Adjutant Generals (TAGs), and Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officers (POMSO)s. This cooperation and support was accomplished through the mutual understanding of the various parties who recognized the need to support neighboring states. Formal State Cooperative agreements were not utilized in this instance.

The Nevada and Oregon helicopter crews were trained prior to fire season to support fire operations in accordance with USFS standards. This prior training enabled out-of-state helicopter crews to eliminate train up time and to respond to the Southern California fires in minimal time.

Other additional CNG support included: command and control, public affairs, and liaison. The aviation commitment entailed heavy maintenance and logistical support. The Oroville Armory was opened for firefighters for three days, but was not utilized.

Period of CNG commitment: 10/25/03 to 11/23/03.

Personnel: A Total of 369 California National Guard and Air Guard members were called to duty. 1,377 Service Member Days [SMD] were expended in support of Wildfire 2003 operations.

Equipment: The CNG deployed 12 helicopters with a water bucket capability and 2 C-130 MAFFS equipped fixed wing aircraft.

Department of Community Services and Development

Description:

The Department of Community Services and Development (CSD)) responded by distributing federal Community Service Block Grant (CSBG) Discretionary funds to the service provider agencies located in the affected fire areas. As administrator of these funds, CSD allowed the recipient agencies to determine how best to use their resources. The agencies coordinated safety-net services with the Red Cross.

In addition, several CDS staff volunteered to travel to the affected sites to provide assistance. CSD's public information officer traveled to Pasadena to assist with the Spanish media.

CSD does not have a DOC. Therefore, they did not utilize SEMS and cannot evaluate it

Period of CSD commitment: 10/27/2003 to 12/30/2003.

Personnel: CSD's public information officer traveled to Pasadena to assist with the Spanish media.

Equipment: No equipment necessary.

Department of Fish and Game

Description:

The Department of Fish and Game mobilized emergency personnel and deployed their law enforcement officers to the fires in San Diego and San Bernardino Counties. All peace officers and associated support staff deployed worked within their own jurisdictions and coordinated their efforts with local fire and law authorities. Support staff planned, organized, directed and coordinated law enforcement activities for the officers in the field. The department's law enforcement officers, while in the field, conducted such activities as general traffic control, evacuations, control of ingress and egress of the affected areas, emergency first aid, general support of fire fighting activities, and patrol of evacuated areas.

Period of Department of Fish and Game commitment: 10/26/03-11/02/03

Personnel: Field officers and support staff logged 286.25 hours of overtime between the dates of October 26, 2003 and November 2, 2003.

Equipment: Department vehicles used.

California Department of Food and Agriculture

Description:

Animal Branch response: CDFA began monitoring the situation on Thursday, October 23, 2003. Personnel in the Ontario District notified the headquarters regarding the severity of the fires in their area. (Staff had to leave work to attend to their personal property.) The California Animal Response Emergency Systems (CARES) Program Manager began an Alert, Warning, and Notification procedure. Phone calls started coming in that day from CARES' "first" responder groups (i.e., non-profit organizations) who were monitoring and actually being requested to deploy to both San Bernardino and San Diego Counties to rescue, care, and shelter animals (both pet and livestock).

The following specific actions were taken:

CDFA called the Southern REOC to see if they were receiving any calls regarding animal issues. The REOC indicated that they were receiving calls and that they would request a mission tasking for a CDFA Liaison to join the team in the Southern REOC.

Mission Request #OES-4001 was issued on October 10/24/03. CDFA filled the mission request by sending a staff veterinarian from the Ontario District office to field calls regarding animal issues, including disposal issues that may arise. That liaison arranged for phone coverage during the operational period for the following week, as needed.

CDFA had a San Diego representative (veterinarian) who responded via a request from the SD Agriculture Commissioner to sit in the SD EOC. The veterinarian fielded calls regarding animal issues.

CDFA also had one of the CA Veterinarian Medical Association (CVMA) veterinarians at the SD EOC to help manage with coordinating triage assistance at the various sites where animals were being sheltered.

To summarize, CDFA had a total of eight staff, four from Headquarters and four from District offices who responded to this disaster. In addition, five CARES members responded and assisted with the rescue, care, and shelter of animals. Both San Diego and San Bernardino counties requested mutual aid from National Animal organizations. The following teams of 5 or more responded to the fires: the Humane Society of the United States [HSUS], Western Region office; California Veterinary Medical Association [CVMA]; Emergency Animal Rescue Service [EARS]; and Noah's Wish.

California Department of Food and Agriculture (continued)

Division of Fairs & Expositions (F&E) response:

Fairs were contacted directly by their respective county agencies for use of their facility for animal evacuation and housing, and/or by the Department of Forestry for use as a fire camp and staging area for local firefighters. The fairs worked directly with their local government agency contacts for coordination of support services. F&E began contacting fairs that resided in the affected counties; collecting status reports on the number of animals, fire trucks, and firefighters housed. There were seven (7) fairgrounds in Southern California whose facilities were utilized for the housing of animals and/or for setup and operation of fire camps. During peak occupation, these seven (7) fairs housed approximately 1700 horses and large animals, 300 small animals, 300 fire trucks, and 700 firefighters.

Period of Department of Food and Agriculture commitment: 10/23/03-11/03

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health

Description:

The California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) was initially contacted by the State Operations Center to answer safety concerns. Integration into the SEMS command staff and safety officer was not planned nor was it achieved. DIR DOSH staff participated in the OES SOC and DFO and provided limited assistance at the CDF Command Posts.

DIR DOSH staff provided occupational safety and health monitoring and training at burn sites including: debris removal operations safety, tree trimming and falling operation safety, crane safety, air and material sampling for asbestos and metals in debris clearing operations, and distributed respirators to responders and recovery workers. In addition, the DIR DOSH website was used to develop and make available fact sheets and other information related to safety and health protection of responders and recovery workers.

Historically, DOSH has not been recognized as an important resource for safety officers. Future integration of DOSH through planning and coordination can provide significant assistance to the safety function of SEMS. As a result of DOSH's participation in the Wildfires 2003 response functions, DOSH is developing an Emergency management Plan to provide organizational structure for future emergency response activities. DOSH hopes to achieve greater integration into the SEMS process.

Period of DIR DOSH commitment: 11/03/03 to 12/31/03.

Personnel: A total of 20 DIR DOSH staff were deployed to participate in response activities in support of the Wildfires 2003 operations.

Equipment: The DIR DOSH personnel used industrial hygiene sampling equipment to perform air and material sample testing. DIR DOSH also loaned some of the industrial hygiene sampling equipment to FEMA/OSHA.

California Department of Insurance

Description:

The California Department of Insurance (CDI) Emergency Response Unit was activated. CDI staff was deployed to established Local Assistance Centers (LACs) and OES' Regional Emergency Operations Center. Staff was rotated for the duration of the activation. CDI conducted six workshops in the affected areas to provide information to the victims. Follow-up meetings are pending. CDI staff also provided brochures and consumer informational items to the public at the LACs and workshops. In addition, CDI Damage Assessment Teams accompanied OES staff.

Claims have been filed with CDI against various insurance carriers and/or brokers. Requests for assistance (complaint) forms have been received and are under investigation.

Period of DOI commitment: 11/01 /03 to continuing (processing complaints)

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: Staff was equipped with laptop computers and pagers to allow communication with headquarters staff and to provide additional information to the public

Department of Health Services (DHS)

Description:

The CDHS opened its DEOC following Gubernatorial Declarations of Emergency in San Diego, Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino and Riverside counties. In addition to the DEOC, CDHS activated its Richmond Laboratory Emergency Operations Center (RLEOC) to facilitate laboratory support and consultation related to public health hazards associated with this event. The RLEOC also functioned as a remote center for staffing of the Division of Environmental and Occupational Disease Control. At the request of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES), the CDHS also provided staffing support to the State Operations Center. Specific division activities:

Licensing and Certification (L&C)	Monitored the evacuation of health facilities. A total of 27 facilities evacuated, including two (2) general acute care hospitals, three (3) skilled nursing facilities, and a total of 22 intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled. Primarily in San Bernardino county but Los Angeles and San Diego counties were also impacted. L&C staff partnered with emergency coordinators to identify number/type facilities in area and vacant beds available for relocation of evacuated patients. All patients returned to evacuated facilities by 11/5/03.
Division of Drinking Water (DWD)	The DWD provided intensive oversight of facilities of the affected public water systems in Los Angeles, San Diego, San Bernardino, Riverside and Ventura Counties. DWD provided technical support to the Local Primacy Agencies (LPAs). All counties except Ventura were granted primacy by CDHS for systems serving less than 200 service connections. The DWD and LPAs protected public health by issuance of Boil Water Orders (BWOs), evaluating ongoing and special water quality monitoring and recommending that public water systems take other protective measures (i.e. increase disinfectant levels). The DWD coordinated with CDHS representatives from L&C, FDB and local environmental health agencies regarding BWOs and changes in disinfectant levels. As example, L&C was notified when Metropolitan Water District of Southern California raised Chloramine disinfectant levels as a protective measure. L&C could then notify dialysis centers/patients to more closely monitor their treatment systems providing water to dialysis machines. After the fires, the DWD completed inspections/damage assessments of key facilities of affected utilities. DWD also provided support to LPAs in their efforts to complete assessments of the utilities they regulate.

Department of Health Services (DHS) (continued)

Radiological Health	Monitored fire movement to assess the need for possible evacuation of radiological material.
Center for Health Statistics (CHS)	The CDHS Center for Health Statistics (DHS-CHS) was deployed to assist fire victims with replacement of birth and death certificates lost in the fires. Staff assisted the victims with identifying the location of the registration of births/deaths throughout the nation, and assisted them with the completion of applications for replacement certificates. Requests to be processed at the state level were hand carried or faxed to DHS-CHS, Office of Vital Records for immediate processing. Staff also assisted other emergency volunteers with unloading supply trucks and sorting clothing and bedding for fire victims.
Emergency Planning Office (EPO)	Coordination of DHS efforts. Ensured the DHS website had information addressing public health concerns.

Period of Department of Health Services commitment: 10/27/03-11/3/03

Personnel: Over 25 CDHS staff in 6 divisions, Licensing and Certifications (L&C), Drinking Water (DWD), Emergency Planning Office (EPO), Environmental Management Division (EMD), the Food and Drug Branch (FDB), Center for Health Statistics (DHS-CHS), and the Radiological Health Branch (RHB) provided both on-site response, support to the DEOC during emergency operations, and assistance to victims during recovery.

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

Department of Motor Vehicles

Description:

DMV staff was deployed to seven Local Assistance Centers to serve victims of the 2003 Wildland Fires by providing them with information and documents to obtain replacement identification cards, Drivers Licenses and Registration documents as needed. No additional planning or preparation for these events was required as staff pulled necessary supplies and materials from the local DMV field offices to address the particular needs of the fire victims.

Period of DMV commitment: 11/01/03 to 11/26/03.

Personnel: DMV assigned 28 staff to seven (7) Local Assistance Centers in Southern California.

Equipment: DMV field offices provided the appropriate supplies and materials necessary to assist victims of the fire with replacing lost registration, Drivers' License and identification cards.

Department of Parks and Recreation- California State Parks

Description:

When the Old and Grand Prix Fires began to threaten the Silverwood lake State Recreation Area in San Bernardino County and the Cedar Fire began to threaten the Cuyamaca Rancho and Palomar Mountain State Park in San Diego County, Headquarters management personnel in Sacramento activated their Department Emergency Operations Center (DOC), to coordinate assistance to the field office at the affected parks and sent additional agency staff and equipment to the affected areas. In addition, two agency representatives were dispatched to OES' SOC. The DOC remained operational until the threat of fire was past. Staff responded to the fires as follows:

Response Activities:

The State Parks peace officers assisted in law enforcement operations, including command and control, patrol and enforcement of closures, evacuation procedures, and research and research missions as needed. This also included responding to one homicide within the State Park jurisdiction that was turned over to the San Bernardino Sheriff/Coroner. Parks firefighters assisted with fire services. Other Department staff provided technical assistance, support work and filed all five SEMS functions in the DOC. In addition, the Department received assistance from California Conservation Corps (CCC) personnel, including 4 crews of 15 persons each. CCC crews performed hazard mitigation services, including removal of potentially hazardous dead trees, and clearance of charred and dead brush away from roads and buildings.

Recovery Activities:

During the recovery phase, Department managers participated in a Multi-Agency Support Group (MASG) within San Bernardino County to deal with the fire impact on the Silverwood Lake area. The Department undertook considerable hazard mitigation efforts, including tree removal, flood prevention, and slope stabilization, in conjunction with the CCC and the Department of Water Resources (DWR). DWR provided an agency liaison to Parks DOC who was instrumental in coordinating mutual aid between the two Departments.

State Parks has undertaken considerable reconstruction activities, particularly designed to mitigate flood and mudslide impacts in the Silverwood Lake and Cuyamaca Rancho areas. Department management fully participated in all phases of the FEMA documentation and reimbursement procedures for the fires that impacted the state park jurisdictions in San Bernardino and San Diego counties.

Period of Department of Parks and Recreation commitment: 10/26/03 to 2/2/04
(DOC activated 10/27/03 to 10/31/03).

Department of Parks and Recreation- California State Parks (continued)

Personnel: 90 Total State Parks personnel responded to fires as follows:
15 Headquarters staff manned the DOC
2 Agency representative were dispatched to OES' SOC
29 State Park Peace Officers assisted law enforcement
2 Firefighters provided fire services
58 Provided other response activities, including support, technical assistance, hazard mitigation

Equipment:
1- Type 1 Fire Engine
1- Type 6 Brush truck
2- Loaders
2- Chippers
1- Grader
1- Water Truck
2- Rented Generators (65 Watt and 35 Watt)
1- 65 Watt Generator
4- Small Generators
20- Chain Saws
12- Cell Phones
5- Four-wheel Drive Pick-up Trucks

Department of Social Services

Description:

The California Department of Social Services (CDSS) mobilized, deployed and supported the Health and Human Services Agency's (HHSA) Volunteer Emergency Services team (VEST) in support of the Care and Shelter Branch of the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) Southern California Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC). Six members of the Vest were deployed to the REOC. The Department also recruited, trained, mobilized, deployed and supported a cadre of state employees in support of OES' Individual Assistance (IA) program. These volunteer employees served at Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), OES and affected local governments.

Period of CDSS commitment: 10/21/03 to 1/9/04.

Personnel: CDSS' Disaster and Safety Services Bureau provided 10 full-time employees to provide services at CDSS' Department Operations Center (DOC). In addition, 34 CDSS trained volunteers were deployed to assist in DRCs located in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside and San Diego Operational Areas through December 12, 2004. A single volunteer assisted at CDSS' Department Operations Center. Another 41 volunteers augmented CDSS' Disaster and Safety Services Bureau's response effort.

Equipment: CDSS utilized equipment provided in the DRCs and DOC.

Department of Water Resources (DWR)

Description:

- Filled Mission Request Tasks from SOC and Southern REOC (provide liaisons and various technical assistance);
- Provided modified flood fight training to CDF, CCC, and locals;
- Sent technical expert to assess existing debris basin dams located at Cuyumaca State Park;
- Scheduled and conducted flood preparedness and coordination meetings between DWR, United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and OES with San Diego, San Bernardino, Riverside, LA and Ventura Counties. Prepared plan of action for coordinating DWR flood operations and coordination with local and federal flood agencies
- Provided technical staff from throughout the Department to attend OES/FEMA meetings in So CA;
- Participated in Multi-Agency Support Group (MASG) meetings;
- Requested USACE PL84-99 assistance to clean 31 existing San Bernardino County debris basins to their original design capacity; maintain coordination with USACE and served as lead state agency;
- In coordination with OES, drafted numerous requests for FEMA to extend fire incident period to include Christmas day storm event;
- Prepared to move pre-positioned flood fight materials to Southern California;
- Performed necessary coordination on FEMA National Flood Insurance Program (NIFP);
- Evaluated damages and impacts to the State Water Project (SWP) and insured source water was available for fire fighting needs;
- Performed debris clearance, reconstruction, and protective measures. This included revegetation, flood debris and mudflow protection, repair of areas damaged by fire fighting equipment. Work is/was being accomplished through DWR resources as well as contracted work.
- Filed 13 FEMA Public Assistance/damage claims.

In addition, DWR has concluded that the five impacted counties will be under threat of soil erosion, mud and debris flows, and flooding for the next 3 to 5 years or until the denuded watershed slopes grow back sufficient vegetation. Because of this scenario, the department is looking for the means to pre-position flood fighting stockpiles within the region and also has modified its flood fight training course to address the regional/local situation.

Period of Commitment: 10/23/03-02/02/04

Department of Water Resources (DWR (continued))

Personnel:

Fire response period: Approximately 15 personnel from the State Water Project (SWP) facility.

During the immediate post fire period (somewhat more recovery, more advance planning): 3 staff at SOC, 2 at Southern REOC, up to 12 participating in meetings, conference calls, FEMA NFIP, and a team of 5 engineers/environmental specialists.

Post Christmas Day debris and mudflows: Up to 9 flood operations and executive staff, approx 10 SWP civil maintenance workers, and 1-3 control systems techs

Recent February 2004 SOC and Southern REOC activation: Involved up to 3 DWR technical staff in SOC, 2 in Southern REOC and 6 up to 10 staff on daily coordination and information dissemination conference calls.

Equipment:

Fire response period: Light to medium trucks and one water truck.

Post Christmas Day debris and mudflows: Various light to medium pickup trucks, 1-2 small front loaders, 2 dump trucks, 1 water truck and 1 grader.

Recent February 2004 SOC and Southern REOC activation: Involved 2-8'x40' and 3-8'x40' shipping containers of flood fight supplies were moved from San Luis Dam area to Los Alamitos - involved 2 DWR construction office staff and a contracted construction firm using tractor trailer rigs and large hydraulic crane.

Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA)

Description:

EMSA

- EMSA staffed the Medical/Health branch at Southern REOC and SOC. EMSA management provided input for policy decisions at SOC.
- EMSA conducted medical/health conference calls twice daily with all affected jurisdictions and representatives from regional, state and federal agencies. Purpose of these calls was for information management and coordination of resources/responses.

DMAT Information

Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) Wildland fire teams provided medical coverage at four fire camps (treating injured/ill firefighters). Approximately 58 DMAT members spent 265 man-days in the field, conducting 24/7 operations for much of this time. They treated over 300 patients and dispensed medical supplies to over 6,000 firefighters.

Ambulance Providers

- First Responder EMS system in Ventura and San Diego counties made arrangements for “mutual aid” (private ambulance in Ventura County; combination of private and public providers in San Diego county) but for some days the resources were less than adequate for demand/coverage. This has a significant implication for future disaster medical response.
- Private ambulance provider American Medical Response ran ambulance calls in three cities, amounting to 4,430 calls, 17 “strike teams”, 115 ambulances, liaisons at 7 Incident Command Posts/EOCs, staffing at 4 Red Cross Shelters and 2 CDF/Forestry Fire Camps over a 13-day period.
- On October 26th the Ventura County EMS Administrator advised all local ambulance providers to cease routine transfer operations and to prepare all resources for emergency responses. Additionally, local fire department first responders stopped responding to routine 911 medical calls in order to maintain resources for fire and rescue responses. AMR immediately staffed five additional paramedic ambulances and deployed them to areas impacted by the reduced response levels. All 911 medical calls were triaged by the local Emergency Medical Dispatchers and single ambulances were dispatched to calls determined not to need additional resources/personnel.
- American Medical Response (AMR) Los Angeles County requested ambulances from their Ventura County Division who then requested additional units as backfill from Santa Barbara County. Two ambulances traveled from Santa Barbara to respond to this request, and this was “managed well within the private sector purview”.

Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) (continued)

Medical Facilities

- Public Health nurses as well as physicians and nurses from medical centers were also deployed to Red Cross shelters to assist with patient care.
- Hospitals ramped up staffing and ordered additional respiratory care supplies. Two hospitals (Big Bear and Lake Arrowhead) evacuated because the approaching fires threatened them, and the LEMSA in San Bernardino County participated in destination determination.
- Most of the medical clinics in the San Diego and Imperial County areas remained open for the week, and one (Mountain Health and Community Services) set up their own 24-hour shelter to care for rural residents displaced by the fire. Some clinics experienced losses related to personnel, supplies and patient revenue. Temporary personnel were hired to replace staff affected by the wildfires. Flu vaccines spoiled due to loss of power supplies, and pharmaceutical caches were depleted when clinics provided free medications to walk-in patients. Overall, patient visits decreased significantly (20% - 80%) at all clinics – most likely a result of public address warnings for people to stay indoor. It is estimated that over one-third of clinic visits were due to respiratory conditions and required interventions with medications. Because of power outages, the greatest need at clinics was for generators to continue basic operations/services.

Period of EMSA commitment: 10/23/03-11/2/03

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

Governor's Office of Emergency Services

Description:

During the October-November fire siege, OES performed the following activities:

- Activated and staffed the SOC;
- Activated and staffed the Southern REOC;
- Disseminated public information on the wildfires;
- Dispatched OES staff to the field ICPs and OA EOCs;
- Dispatched OASIS and other communication resources;
- Provided Geographic Information Systems (GIS) support to different levels of government;
- Coordinated with federal agencies, such as FEMA;
- Coordinated state agency resources and mutual aid;
- Coordinated Emergency Manager's Mutual Aid (EMMA), and;
- Advised the Governor and key government officials on wildfires status/issues.

In addition, OES supported the Blue Ribbon Fire Commission (BRC) in its evaluation and fact-finding process initiated in 11/03. (Recovery activities are addressed under Recovery)

Period of OES commitment: 10/21/03-3/31/03 (response and recovery)

Personnel: 10/03-160 staff, 11/03- 267 staff

Equipment: Fire engines –102; Water tenders –5; computer and office equipment in operations centers; communications equipment; GIS technology.

Governor's Office on Service and Volunteerism (GOSERV)

Description:

GOSERVE is a recently developed office in state government. Due to this fact, it is still developing procedures and protocols to address volunteer and donated goods issues.

Among the entities GOSERV deals with are:

- Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) with offices in both California and Washington, D.C. and member organizations (AmeriCorps, VISTA, National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC), etc.)
- The Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) Medical Reserve Corps
- Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)
- Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
- American Red Cross
- The Salvation Army
- Volunteer Centers of California (VCC)
- Citizen Corps Council/Citizen Corps
- California Department of Social Services

The wildfires highlighted the need for integration of GOSERVE and volunteer entities into emergency response at all levels of government. For example, more than 500 CERT members were available to assist. Approximately, 100 CERT members were used to set up and organize evacuation centers, assist evacuees, coordinate traffic, solicit donations for firefighters and evacuees, provide information to evacuees and responders, aid in the transportation of supplies, assist the Red Cross, etc. Thousands of national service members (AmeriCorps, VISTA, National Civilian Community Corps, Tribal Community Corps, etc.) were available to help in the relief and recovery phases. Volunteer Centers were stretched by the large numbers of people interested in helping. While these centers performed admirably, these same centers were overextended by that staff hours and expenses involved.

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

RECOVERY SUMMARY

**State agencies
recovery activities
chart**

This chart summarizes recovery activities for state agencies and departments. See Recovery Detail (Attachment F) for more information. Agencies and organizations were not asked to provide specific information on personnel and equipment deployment. If available, this information has been included in the matrix. N/A= data not available, not submitted

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
California Conservation Corps (CCC)	Recovery work for various agencies, including channel clearing, debris removal, sandbagging, dead tree removal, etc.	N/A	N/A
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection	Personnel still working on rehabilitation efforts and bark beetle problem. Crews were involved in work surrounding post incident flooding events.	N/A	N/A
California Department of Transportation	Damage assessment of highways completed immediately after event; \$25.3 million expended in Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) funds for emergency reopening and recovery; \$2.3 million in FEMA claims filed	N/A	N/A
California Environmental Protection Agency	Cal/EPA worked extensively with local government on recovery activities. The California Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB) provided staffing at the Disaster Field Office in Pasadena.	N/A	N/A
Department of Community Services and Development	Administered federal Community Service Block Grant (CSBG) Discretionary funds to service provider agencies in impacted areas.	Department's public information officer traveled to Pasadena to assist with Spanish media.	N/A

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
RECOVERY SUMMARY**

ATTACHMENT E

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
Department of Fish and Game	Conducted damage assessments on its lands, identifying areas needing revegetation, slope and erosion control, tree removal, habitat restoration, and boundary/access fencing. Department has submitted claims to FEMA for reimbursement for law enforcement overtime, erosion control projects, fencing, and various items lost in the San Diego fires.	N/A	N/A
Department of Food and Agriculture	Animal Control organizations have been working on compiling statistics related to the fires. The department is applying for public assistance due to expenses incurred.	N/A	N/A
Department of Insurance	Rotated staff in support to Local Assistance Centers (LACs). Conducted workshops. Provided brochures and consumer informational items to public. Department Damage Assessment Teams accompanied OES staff. Claims have been filed with the department against various insurance carriers and/or brokers.	N/A	Laptops and computers.
Department of Mental Health	Assisted counties with the federal FEMA Crisis Counseling Program (CCP) application process. Developed and submitted the state application for FEMA CCP funding. Implemented FEMA CCP projects in San Bernardino, San Diego, and Los Angeles County.	4-6 personnel	N/A

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
RECOVERY SUMMARY**

ATTACHMENT E

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)	Deployed staff to seven Local Assistance Centers. Staff assisted the victims with replacement of identification cards, drivers' licenses and registration documents.	28 staff	Supplies and equipment drawn from local DMV offices
Department of Parks and Recreation	Participated in multi-agency support group (MASG) within San Bernardino County regarding Silverwood Lake area. Undertook considerable hazard mitigation efforts in conjunction with CCC and DWR. Reconstruction activities for Silverwood Lake and Cuyamaca Rancho areas. Participated in the FEMA documentation and reimbursement procedures.	See Response Detail	See Response Detail
Department of Social Services (DSS)	Provided support to Health and Human Services Team (VEST) for the Care and Shelter Branch, Southern REOC.	10 staff at DSS department operations center (DOC) Six VEST personnel deployed to the REOC. One volunteer at the DOC. 41 volunteers at the DSS Disaster and Safety Services Bureau.	Equipment in the DOC.
Department of Water Resources	Damage assessment of State Water Project facilities; debris clearance, reconstruction and protective measures; filed public assistance damage claims. Coordinated with US Army Corps of Engineers.	See Response Detail	See Response Detail
Emergency Medical Services Authority	Provided technical assistance on medical recovery efforts.	N/A	N/A

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
RECOVERY SUMMARY**

ATTACHMENT E

Agency/Dept.	Activities	Personnel	Equipment
Office of Emergency Services	OES and FEMA established DFO. OES staff coordinated establishment of seven LACs. OES staffed several DRCs, and helped coordinate the MASG.	144 (12/03) 111 (1/04) 98 (2/04)	Office equipment and supplies

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
RECOVERY DETAIL**

ATTACHMENT F

RECOVERY ACTIVITIES

California Conservation Corps (CCC)

The CCC has done recovery work for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, US Forest Service Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER), California Parks and Recreation, County of San Diego, City of San Diego, and San Diego Gas and Electric. Work included: channel clearing, debris removal, sandbagging, dead trees downed, debris piles burned, etc. Recovery work started in mid-November and continued through 2/12/04.

California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (CDF)

The CDF has provided recovery assistance to other agencies in support of incidents occurring in the aftermath of the October event. Work included: channel clearing, debris removal, sandbagging, dead trees downed, debris piles burned, etc. Recovery work started in mid-November and continued through February.

CDF also provided assistance in Archeology Site identification and preservation. Five CDF Archeologists were assigned statewide to many of the major incidents that were associated with the October fire events. They were instrumental in working with Native American tribes in the greater Southern California area to identify and preserve historical sites in fire impact areas.

California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA)

Department of Toxic Substances Control

Technical assistance was provided to all of the impacted operational areas with the issuance of a blanket exemption to facilitate the expeditious management and disposal of burn debris and ash into Class III Landfills.

Technical consultative review and comment on the sampling plan in support of San Diego County's assessment of the impacted residential areas. This activity was coordinated with an OES-facilitated multi-agency debris management work group.

California Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB)

The CIWMB provided ongoing staffing, representing both the CIWMB and Cal/EPA, at the Disaster Field Office in Pasadena. In December, with cessation of most activities at the Pasadena office, the CIWMB provided ongoing staffing at the San Diego field office and periodic staffing at the Colton field office. As of January 2, 2004, CIWMB staff continues to be on call at the San Diego and Colton field offices.

As part of its involvement at the field offices, CIWMB staff have helped coordinate policy responses and provide information on the handling and proper management of materials such as burn ash, telephone poles, household hazardous wastes, railroad ties, auto bodies, asbestos-containing materials, fuel-contaminated soil, and animal carcasses.

The CIWMB developed an outstanding web page to provide this much-needed information to State and local agencies, and took the lead in putting together the umbrella Cal/EPA web page for the fire response. These web pages include guidance on the handling and proper management of the materials mentioned above, along with links regarding emergency funding, relevant regulations, etc.

The massive amounts of fire debris being cleaned up have affected or will affect the operations of numerous solid waste management facilities. In early November, the CIWMB issued a letter to all local enforcement agencies (LEAs), which are responsible for permitting and inspection of solid waste management operations and facilities, regarding the process for obtaining emergency waivers pursuant to Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations, commencing with Section 17210. These waiver, when granted, allow facilities to accept debris tonnage above daily permitted levels, conduct activities outside of permitted operating hours, and allow for traffic volumes to accommodate the increased tonnages. The duration of emergency waiver grants at impacted solid waste management facilities and operations ranges from 90 to 120 days. The waivers may be modified and/or extended, if they are deemed necessary to assist in the cleanup and diversion efforts. The waivers may also be rescinded, if it becomes evident that they are no longer necessary for the desired efforts.

California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) (continued)

The CIWMB's Executive Director may condition, limit, suspend, or terminate an operator's use of a waiver, if it is determined that the use of the waiver would cause harm to public health and safety, or the environment, or it is found that the operator has not utilized reasonably available waste diversion programs as identified in its waiver documentation. The Executive Director reports to the Board on any granting of waivers, and all determinations made concerning them.

As of February 2004, LEAs in the City and County of San Diego and Los Angeles County had granted emergency waivers for six landfills, five transfer stations, and five rural bin sites pursuant to Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations, commencing with Section 17210:

CITY OF SAN DIEGO:

Sycamore Landfill
West Miramar Landfill

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO:

Otay Landfill
Ramona Landfill
Borrego Springs Landfill
Ramona Transfer Station & MRF
Julian Transfer Station
Viejas Transfer Station
Palomar Transfer Station
Barrett Junction Rural Bin Site
Boulevard Rural Bin Site
Campo Rural Bin Site
Palomar Mountain Rural Bin Site
Ranchita Rural Bin site
EDCO Station

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES:

Puente Hills Landfill

Department of Community Services and Development (CSD)

CSD distributes and administers Community Service Block Grant funds to a network of community-based organizations to provide safety-net services to low-income residents.

During this disaster, CSD responded by directing \$855,000 in Discretionary CSBG funds to the agencies located in the impacted areas. These funds were used for emergency supplies and services. Local personnel from these agencies worked in coordination with other agencies such as the Red Cross to help disaster victims with emergency needs.

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA)

Activities accomplished at the local level:

- Patients have been repatriated to the two hospitals evacuated during the fires.
- Clinics and hospitals have returned to normal operations and staffing levels.
- Medical supply caches are being restored to normal levels.

Personnel: N/A

Equipment: N/A

**STATEWIDE AAR
2003 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY**

ATTACHMENT G

This section summarizes agencies/departments responses to a series of questions regarding emergency management procedures.

AFTER ACTION REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY

Question	yes	no	<u>N/A</u>
Were procedures established and in place for response to the disaster?	19	2	2
Were procedures used to organize initial and ongoing response?	19	3	
Was the ICS used to manage field response?	17	1	6
Was Unified Command considered or used?	10	3	11
Was your EOC and/or DOC activated?	18	1	5
Was the EOC and/or DOC organized according to SEMS?	17		6
Were sub-functions in the EOC/DOC assigned around the five SEMS functions?	18		5
Were response personnel in the EOC/DOC trained?	16	3	5
Were action plans used in the EOC/DOC?	14	4	6
Were action planning processes used at the field response level?	14	5	5
Was there coordination with volunteer agencies such as the Red Cross?	10	4	10
Was an Operational Area EOC activated?	12	1	11
Was Mutual Aid requested?	12	4	8
Was Mutual Aid received?	12	2	10
Was Mutual Aid coordinated from the EOC/DOC?	12	3	9
Was an inter-agency group established at the EOC/DOC level?	15	2	6
Were communications established and maintained between agencies?	21		3
Was the public alerting warning conducted according to procedure?	8	1	15
Was public safety and disaster information coordinated with the media?	9	2	10